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Ten case  studies  suggest  that  two unorthodox  methods  of deficit
financing - inflation tax and financial repression - are both
ineffective  in raising  revenue  and disruptive  of macroeconomic
stability. Fiscal stabilization  leads to both higher private con-
sumption  and increased  investment  and to external adjustment
- characterized  by a lower  trade deficit and a depreciated  real
exchange  rate.
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This paper -a  product  of the Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth  Division,  Country  Economics  Department
-isa  synthesis  of a research  project  on "The  Macroeconomics  of Public  Sector  Deficits"  (RPO  675-31).  An earlier
draft was presented  at the World  Bank  Conference  on Macroeconomics  of Public  Sector  Deficits,  Washington,  DC,
June 1991.  Copies  areavailable  free  from  the World  Bank, 1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington  DC  20433. Please  contact
Rebecca Martin,  room Ni 1-053,  extension  39065  (91 pages). October 1991.
Easterly  and Schmidt-Hebbel  examine  the macroeco-  countries' time  series  data find  revenue-maximizing
nomic  consequences  of public  deficits by summariz-  inflation  rates that seem  to rise with  actual average
ing the results  of ten case studies  of developing  inflation  - the "optimum"  rate is estimated  to be
countries  - Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Cote  only  4 percent in Thailand,  but 966 percent  in
d'lvoire, Ghana, Morocco,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Thai-  Argentina. The assumption  of a money  demand with
land,  and Zimbabwe  - as well as by examining  constant  semi-elasticity  for inflation  overestimates  the
broader  evidence.  "optimum"  inflation  rate in high-inflation  countries
Cross-section  correlations  of fiscal  balances  with  and underestimates  it in low-inflation  countries.
macroeconomic  variables  are surprisingly  strong.  Seigniorage  is unimportant  as a steady-state  phenom-
Stable  and low fiscal deficits  are associated  with  good  enon, but it can be important  as a temporary  source  of
growth  performance. Fiscal balances  are positively  revenue  in times  of crisis. Even large surges  of
related  to investment  and to current  account balances.  money  creation  are not closely linked  to accelerated
High  fiscal deficits show  an association  with highly  inflation.
negative  real  interest rates (financial  repression),  Financial  repression  is a common  resort for
money  creation,  and high  black market  exchange  rate  countries  in a fiscal  crisis. But the collapse  of private
premia. The aggregate  of the ten case studies  shows  credit, investment,  and growth in those countrics
an association  between  fiscal  adjustment  in the 1980s,  following  episodes  of financial  repression  hardly
improvement  of the currenf  account,  and real  depre-  makes it the recommended  way to deal with  crises.
ciation of the exchange  rate.  Private  consumption  and investment  are signifi-
The case studies  show that  both foreign  and  cantly  affected by the public budget  structure,  the
domestic  macroeconomic  shocks play  a secondary  overall  deficit,  and its financing. Private  consumption
role in the cyclical variation  and structural  changes  of  is reduced  by income  taxes  - with the size of the
nonfinancial  public  sector  deficits. Active fiscal  effect in between  what the Keynesian  and permanent-
policies,  under the direct  control of policymakers,  are  income  hypotheses  would  predict. Public saving  (or
both the main  culprit  of fiscal  crises  and an effective  the public  surplus)  tends to raise consumption
instrument  in bringing  about fiscal  adjustment. Fiscal  somewhat  - particularly  in countries  where the
adjustment  is achieved  by reducing  overblown  public sector  has preferred  access to resources  of the
government  bureaucracies,  cutting  inefficient  financial  system. Real interest  and inflation  rates -
transfers  and subsidies,  reforming  tax systems  to  and hence  how the public  deficit is financed  - do not
increase  broad-based  taxation,  and reforming  or  affect  private  consumption  in any systematic  way.
privatizing  public  enterprises  and comnmodity  Responses  of private  investment  to the public
marketing  boards.  capital stock (or to public  investment)  range widely.
Inflation  does not show any simple  correlation  And the fiscal  deficit  explains  a great deal of variation
with fiscal  deficits across  countries. The cross-  in the trade deficit  and the real  exchange  rate. The
section  relationship  between  inflation  and money  "fundamentals"  approach  to the real  exchange  rate is
creation shows  a "Laffer  curve" pattern,  with  maxi-  vindicated,  which  should  serve as an antidote to the
mum  seigniorage  at inflation  between  68 percent  and  notion that  nominal  devaluation  alone  can restorc
160  percent. In conu ist, the stud:es  using individual  macroeconomic  balances.
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.INTRODUCI1ON
Fiscal  deficits  have been at the forefront of macroeconomic  adjustment  in the 1980s,  both
in developing  and developed  countries. Fiscal  deficits  were blame,d  in good part for the
assortment  of ills  that beset developing  countries  in the 1980s:  over-indebtedness  leading  to the
debt crisis  beginning  in 1982,  high inflation,  and poor investment  and growth  performance. This
paper will examine  the evidence  for the macroeconomic  effects  of fiscal  deficits,  using  the results
of a set of 10 case  studies done for the World Bank research  project,  "The Macroeconomics  of
Public  Sector Deficits."  The ten cases  were Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  C6te d'Ivoire,  Ghana,
Morocco,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Thailand  and Zimbabwe.
The methodology  guiding  the case  studies  can be summarized  briefly.' The
macroeconomic  effect of the fiscal  deficit  depends  on how  it is financed. To a first
approximation,  each major type of financing  corresponds  to a macroeconomic  imbalance,  if used
excessively.  Money  creation to finance  the deficit  leads to inflation;  domestic  borrowing  leads  to
a credit squeeze and crowding  out of private  investment  and consun.ption;  external  borrowing
leads  to a current account  deficit  and real exchange  rate appreciation.
The effect of the deficit  depends  also on the composition  of spending. Some  types  of
public  consumption  are complements  to private  consumption,  while  others are substitutes.
Deficits  may  directly  lower  private  consumption  if consumers  anticipate  future taxes  and save
accordingly.  Some  public  investments  displace  private  investment;  others raise  private profitability
and thus investment. The effect of fiscal  policy  on the real exchange  rate depends  on the extent
to which  public  spending  is composed  of nontradables.
The organization  of the paper is as foliows:  we first present a summary  of the stylized
facts  of fiscal  adjustment,  both within the 10 case studies  and in a broader  sample  of countries.
We then present the results  of the decomposition  of the deficit in the case studies,  which  seeks to
assess  the degree to which  deficits  were driven by policy  as opposed to external  or macroeconomic
Fuzter detail is avaiiable  in the pfject's  :mah  prposaI  Easterly,  Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989).2
shocls.  The next three sections  use the results  of the case  studies to relate deficits  to
macroeconomic  imbalances:  we first analyze  the relationship  between the domestic  financing  of
deficits,  inflation,  and real interest rates; we then analyze  the relationship  of deficits  to private
consumption  and investment;  finally  we examine  the relationship  of deficits  to external
imbalances.  While macroeconomic  imbalances  are clearly  interrelated,  we assume  the effects  of
such interrelationship  are smaDl  and use a sequence  of partial equilibrium  analyses  of each type  of
imbalance. We then close with some  thoughts  on policy  implications  of the analysis.
L. OVERVIEW
A.  Correlations  of Public  Sector Deficits  with Other Economic  Variables
To get an overview  of the relationship  between fiscal  deficits  and other economic
variables,  we collected  data on a large sample  of countries,  including  OECD countries. The
statistical  appendix  lists the data and sources for this sample. To get a feeling  for the usefulness
of fiscal  deficits  as an indicator  for overall  economic  performance,  we calculated  simple
correlations  between public  sector balances  (as percent of GDP), and other major macroeconomic
variables,  shown  in Table 1.1.
There are good reasons  not to expect very  strong  correlations. Fiscal  deficits  are
measured  different  ways  across  countries,  introducing  some  measurement  error into the sample.
In addition,  the theoretical  relationship  between  deficits  and other macroeconomic  variables
depends  crucially  on the means of financing  them. 2 Despite these caveats,  we find a significant
statistical  relationship  between the deficit and many,  though not all, macroeconomic  performance
variables. Per capita growth  is significantly  and positively  related to fiscal  surpluses. 3 There is
2M1  ge  nally,  simple  corelations may ail to be  dgnifat  because of the ommion of  oter  variable
3An Interaing short-run  counterpat to this result is the suggeuion  of Oiavazzi  an  Papoo (1990)  and  BacbaNd (1990)  that
ficl  awusty ca  be inmknua,3
Table 1.1
:Crssisecton Correlations  of Conlidated  Public  Sector Balance
As Percent of GDP with Qther Variable
.. ~~I
C-orreatg.  T-Statistic
GDP growth  - 016
Per capita GDP growth  037  3.02
Per capita growth  with varianw  of
defic-ts  .0.36  -2.88 *
Real intraest rate  0.31  2.34
Money  creation (% of GDP)  -0.33  -2.40  *
Inflation  Q16  -121
Investment  (% of GDP)  0.24  1.70
Total cosumption (% of GDP)  -0.48  -3.97 
.Prvat  csumption  (% of GDP)  -038  -3.00  *
.'Ral  excang  tate  v  415  -1.10
accout  (% of GDP)  054  4.76 
iBlck market premium  -035  .2.65  *'
1/  From David  Doiar (1990)  using PPP comparions from Summers  and Heaton
(1-968);  apprecialtion  is up.
-:  ~  N.-  Public surplus  is positive,  deficit  is neaiv  OECID  countries'  publc balances
are genra  government.  Sample  size vaes  between  50 and 59. Period of
averagesiis  longest  period for which  da  a  a  b  &r each pair  of
cot:cepts  ec  out
Sourc  OECD Economic  Outlook;  Wold Bank  Data
*  - sigpficant at 5% level (one-iled):
:  **:  significant at-  .%  level (one-tailed) 
also an interesting  negative  and significant  correlation  between  per capita growth  and the variance
of fiscal  balanes  Low and stable fiscal  deficits  are associated  with high growth.
Fical balances  are positively  related  to real interest rates, contrary  to the usual  prediction
that deficits  lead to high interest rates and surpluses  to low  ones  Since there are a large number
of negative  real interest rates in the sample,  this is likely  explained  by an association  between
financial  repression  and fiscal  defichs. Fiscal  balances  are negatively  related to money  creation4
(seignorage),  which  confirms  that countries  that run high deficits  do so in part through  greater
reliance  on seignorage. 4 However,  inflation  rates show  little correlation  with fiscal  balances,
perhaps  reflecting  in part the non-linear  relationship  between money  creation and inflation  to be
,Iscussed  in Section m.
Fiscal  balances  are positively,  though weakly,  related to total gross  domestic  investment,
offering  at least superficial  support to the notion that deficits  crowd  out investment. The fiscal
balance is negatively  related to both total and private consumption,  which  is superficially
consistent  with the notions that taxes  crowd  out private  consumption  and that public  and private
consumption  are complements,  and inconsistent  with the "RicardialIA  notion that deficits  lower
consumption. These associations  will  be explored  in more detail using the case study  results in
Section IV.
Fiscal  balances  are correlated  with external  current account  balances  across  countries.
This lends  superficial  support to the "fiscal  approach  to the balance  of payments,"  which  says  that
fiscal  imbalances  are the main source of external  imbalances.?  The causation  behind  the
correlation  could go either way  depending  on the type  of financing  constraint  -- countries  with
more access  to net external  financing  may  run larger deficits,  or those that run large deficits  may
require more external  financing. The estimated  relationship  in the case  studies (as discussed  in
Section  V of this paper) usually  assume  the latter, and find strong time series correlations  as well.
A suggestive  association  is found between  fiscal  balances  and black market premia,  indicating  that
countries  with high deficits  are more likely  to tightly  control the foreign  exchange  market and that
deficits  drive up the premium  created by such controls.' However,  real exchange  rates show  little
association  with fiscal  deficits. This may  reflect the extent to which  trade intervention  differs
4de Ha  awd  Zeihont  (1990)  find  that  the  coreation  hol  only  for high  inflation  countmim
SSW  for mple  BaroH  (1969),  BAlM (1968),  Sfth  (1969)  and Reisen  and van  Trotsenburg  (1988). However,  note that the
fink  brea  down f the Rh:rdlan  hypotb  of offsetdng  private  saving  hold (Leiderman  and  Blejer  (1988),  Frenkd  and Ruzin
(19S7)).
Ooe of the cm  studia,  Ghban,  koked at  this relationship  in deail, and will  be discused  in section  V.5
across  countries. Section  V will  address  summarize  the time-series  relationships  between fiscal
balances  and the real exchange  rate from the case  studies,  which  relationships  tum out to be
surprisingly  strong.
There are two messages  tr be.  carried away  from this set of generally  strong  but
occasionally  weak  set of associations  between  fiscal  balances  and macroeconomic  performance.
One is that the fiscal  balance  is a useful  indicator  of macroeconomic  health despite problems  of
comparability  across  countries. The other is that we need to delve  deeper to trace the effect  of
deficits  on specific  macroecononmic  variables  like  inflation,  private  investment,  and real exchange
rates, as we will  do in the following  sections.
B. Macroeconomic  Trends in Case Study  Countries
Figure 1.1  confirms  that the dominant  macroeconomic  policy  trend of the 1980's  was  fiscal
adjustment. The case study  countries  registered  steady  fiscal  improvement,  on average,  from 1982
to 1988. Other developing  countries  showed  a less pronounced  deficit reduction;  OECD
countries  cut their deficits  in half during  the same  period.
The .ounterpart  to the fiscal  adjustment  in developing  countries  was a huge reduction  in
current account  deficits  as shown  in Figure 1.2. This again was more pronounced  in the case
study  countries  than in other LDCs. The simultaneous  decline  of fiscal  and extemal deficits  is
another bit of evidence  on the close association  between  the two.
The counterpart to the decline  in external  deficits  in the project  case studies is a major
depreciation  of the real exchange  rate as shown  in figure 13.  This is an interesting  contrast to
the remainder  of LDCs,  which  if anything  show  moderate  real appreciation.
While  the real exchange  rate, fiscal  and external  deficits  seem to move  together in the
project case  studies,  this is not the case with inflation  and real interest rates. Figure 1.4 shows
inflation  to be a noisy,  trendless  series  in both the project cases  and in other developing6
Figure 1.1
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countries. 7 This is in contrast to the steady  disinflation  in the OECD countries. Similarly,  real
interest rates show  no trend to speak of in the 10 project  cases  and in other LDCs,  while  real
interest rates rose steadily  in OECD countries  (figure  1.5). The volatity  of the LDC real interest
rates and the large negative  numbers  for average  real interest rates makes  clear that financial
repression  was alive and well  in the 1980s.
We next  examine  the individual  macroeconomic  evolution  of the case  study countries  in
the 1980s. Figure 1.6  shows  the evolution  of consolidated  nonfinancial  public  deficits  in the
1980s.' We see strong fiscal  adjustment  in Chile,  Ghana, Mexico,  and Thailand. Fiscal
adjustment  is absent or reversed  in Argentina,  Cote d'Ivoire,  and Pakistan. Colombia,  Morocco,
and Zimbabwe  are in between.
The composition  of the financing  of the deficit  in the case study  countries  is shown  in
figure 1.7. Argentina,  Ghana, Mexico,  and Zimbabwe  increased  their reliance  on domestic
financing  in the early 1980s  at about the same time the debt crisis  began (late 1982),  the
consequence  of which  was a decline  of external  financing  of fiscal  deficits.' We will  see later how
this led to implicit  taxes  through  financial  repression  in these 4 countries. Morocco  (not shown  in
the graph for lack of data) also turned increasingly  to domestic  finance  in the aftermath  of the
cutoff  of external  lending. Chile experienced  a milder  version  of the turn from external  to
domestic  financing  of the deficit,  until the deficit  was turned into a surplus  in 1987-88.
Colombia  was able to smooth the reduction  in extemal financing  and saw only a gradual
rise in domestic  public  borrowing. Thailand  maintained  steady flows  of domestic  financing  until
deficits  were cut sharply  after'1986. Pakistan  also slowly  increased  its reliance  on domestic
7Couutdts that acperienced  inflation above 1000 percent are ecluded  because  thy  hae  a disproponionate effect  on the aveage.
Thus,  Argentina u  ccluded  from  the project  sertes,  and Bolina, Brazil  and Peru from "othec"  developing  countries  The xciduded
obsevtiom  also do not sba  a ckar  trend.
#Appendix  V describes  deficit definitions.
9Ghaa  subsequently benefitted from  lae  inflows  of foreign  financing (much  of it highly  concessionary)  a  it bepn  a major
reform  program8
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financing  as its  public  external  bor,Rowig  gradually  diminished.  These three countries  avoided
the sharp macroeconomic  crises  that affected  the others, in part because they had greater access
to foreign  financing,  reflecting  good fiscal  behavrior.' 0
'Four of the countries  that were identified  as making  sharp shifts  from extemal to intemal
financing  -- Argentina,  Mexico,  Ghana, Chile -- also had severe episodes  of negative  growth  in the
early 1980s. Ghana's and Chile's  growth  subsequently  recovered  strongly  in the wake  of fiscal
adjustment,  other reforms,  and improved  access  to foreign  financing.  C6te d'Ivoire  experienced  a
severe decline  in external  borrowing  and also had negative  growth. Other countries  that relied
increasingly  on domestic  financing  of deficits  without  a sharp financing  crisis  -- Morocco,
Zimbabwe,  and Colombia  -- have had erratic growth  performance,  but not as poor as the previous
ones.  lle  star performers  are Thailand  and Pakistan,  countries  that had continuing  access  to
external financing  and eschewed  financial  repression  as a means  of financing."
Figure 1.8 shows  the inflation  rates of the case  study  countries  during  the 1980s. There
were accelerations  of inflation  in Argentina,  Ghana, and Mexico  at about the time of the shift
from external to domestic  financing  of fiscal  deficits,  and a milder  temporary  accelerasion  in
Zimbabwe. However,  other countries  that relied  increasingly  on domestic  financing  show  no
evidence  of higher inflation,  as inflation  was stable in Zimbabwe  (after 1983),  Morocco,  Chile,
Pakistan,  and Colombia.
We conclude  from this section that strong  fiscal  and external  adjustment  was typical  of
both the 10 case  studies reviewed  here and LDCs  in general. The case studies  are less  typical  in
the strong real depreciation  they achieved. Inflation  and real interest rates do not show  clear
10Pakaln's deficit was hight but we will see later  how the deficit was consistent with stable debt ratio and low infation untl later
in the 1980L
Ilhe  high grwth in Pakistan  enabled the country  to sustain a higher deficit, as will be discsed  in section 11,  but the sourca of
the gowth are not fully  dear.12
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trends in response  to fiscal  adjustment. The countries  forced to make an abrupt shift from
external to domestic  financing  of the deficit  fared poorly  in terms  of growth,  and some  of them
show  an acceleration  of inflation.
In the remainder  of the paper, we will examine  some  of the problems  posed by the
macroeconomic  stylized  facts  presented here. Were deficits  conscious  policy  choices  or did they
passively  respond to external  and domestic  macroeconomic  variables? How tight is the link
between deficits,  seignorage  and inflation? How much  did countries  resort to financial  repression
to finance  the deficit? What were the consequences  of deficits  for interest rates with and without
financial  repression? How did the deficit  and its composition  affect  private consumption  (and
thus saving), private  investment,  and thus growth  prospects? How important  are deficits  in
explaining  real exchange  rate movements?
H. PUBLIC  DEFICITS:  MEASUREMENT,  CAUSES  AND REMEDIES
TIis section  focuses  on alternative  public  deficit  concepts,  deficit  determinants,  and
components  of successful  fiscal  stabilization  programs,  derived  from the project's 10-country
sample.
A. Public Sector Deficits:  Alternative  Definitions  and Public Sector Coverage
Alternative  deficit  measures  differ by how  they are defined and which  public  sub-sectors
they encompass. Appendix  V'  reviews  the main deficit  categories. Figure 2.1 illustrates
different  above-the-line  deficit categories  for the cases  of Morocco  (1983-88)  and Argentina
(19"80).  The significant  fiscal  adjustment  achieved  by Morocco  is underestimated  by the decline
of its cash basis deficit,  because  the country  was able to reduce its accruals  basis  deficit  at an even
2 For dtaild  diauion  and  auuuanm  of aditerutve  defiat meaur  see Blejer  and Chu  (1968),  Tanzi,  Bleje,  and Tapjeuo
(196), Bu_e (1967),  Coauional  Budget  Office  (1990),  Einer  (1986),  Koikoff (1988),  Fscber  and  East"  (1990),  Makenzie
(1969),  Tanzi  (1965),  Tajdem  (1969),  Towe  (1991),  and  World  Bank  (1988).14
Figure  2.1
PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS:
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND SECTOR COVERAGE
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more stringent  pace by reducing  accumulation  of arrears and starting to repay them in 1986.
However, the operational deficit -- economically  more meaningful than the nominal deficit -- did
not fall as fast as the latter, due to the decline  of the inflation  component  of domestic  interest
payments  resulting  from lower  inflation.
The Argentine  experience  of serious  fiscal  deterioration  illustrates  how  misleading  a
partial measure  of the deficit is when the central bank pursues  quasi-fiscal  programs  leading  to
significant  losses. Between  1980  and 1983  the nominal  consolidated  non-financial  public  sector
(CNFPS)  deficit  doubled,  but a significant  share of this increase  was due to higher nominal
interest payments  from an exploding  inflation. Anyway,  either measure  of the CNFPS  deficit  --
nominal  or operational  -- seriously  underestimates  the deteriorating  total fiscal  stance  in 1982
(and afterwards),  when the Central Bank's  quasi-fiscal  deficit  increased  by an unprecedented  25
percentage  points (pp.) of GDP!
The next  subsections  focus  mostly  on nominal  above-the-line  CNFPS  deficits,  to be
followed  by a last subsection  on quasi-fiscal  and total public  deficits  for the relevant  country  cases.
B.  Sensitivity  of Deficits  to Foreign  Variables
Foreign  shocks  are a source of fiscal  instability  in developing  countries. Commodity
exporters  and highly  indebted  countries  face an inherent instability  from fluctuating  export prices
and foreign  interest rates  which hinder significantly  fiscal  adjustment  efforts. In the following  we
will test the sensitivity  of public  deficits  to foreign  shocks  in a sub-sample  of 6 of the case
studies."
SIu  bnod teas,  countres  ace  four  type of foreign  shock: change  io pnce  sad intemt oonditions  of their  fofeign  trade  and
aedit fows ad uchae  in quantiy  constints affecting  foreign  trade  and  cedit flo.  While  qumatity  constraints  e rather
unnmmon  in foren  trade  (abscting  fro  countnes  affected  by global  embarg  or trade  restrictions  affecting  cerain  items).
mmasie  ces  in borowing  corstraints re  a stylized  fat In  creit markets Th aftermath  of the 1982  debt  crisi  plied  in fact  a
maive  re  hnge in the form  of fop  rewource  constrints  faced  suddenly  by mt  developiln  debtor  economie  While  the
Iatter  costute  a strong  forip  shock  affecting  below-the-line  fionacing  weures w  focus  in the folowing  onlY  on chnges in forign
term of trde  and intest  rates  which  affect  above-the-Une  defcits16
Changes  in export prices affect the public  sector directly  (via profits  of the exporting  state-
owned  company  or marketing  board) or indirectly  (through  taxes  on profits  or on exports). The
quantitative  impact  of the export price shock on government  accounts  depends  on the tax and
property  structure, the amount  exported,  and the magnitude  of the price shocl.  Countries  facing
high export price volatility,  and where a large  share of exports  is through a SOE (such as Chile
and Mexico)  or a marketing  board (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana),  have fiscal  accounts  sensitive  to terms
of trade shocks. Public  sector accounts  in countries  with a diversified  foreign  trade structure
where the private sector is the main exporter and export taxes  are low  or absent,  such as Pakistan
or Zimbabwe,  do not suffer significantly  from export price volatility. Import prices affect  public
expenditure  in some  countries. In Morocco,  for instance,  the decline  in imported  food prices  was
the main cause of the substantial  decline  in subsidies  to the private  sector in the mid-1980s.
Changes  in foreign  interest rates affect  highly-indebted  countries  with a high share of variable-
interest debt, such as Argentina  and Colombia.
In addition  to measuring  the impact  of foreign  shocks  on public  accounts,  it is illuminating
to assess  their contribution  to overall  public  sector deficits. Both dimensions  are presented for 6
countries  in table 2.1. Column 1 determines  the average  absolute  change in public  deficits  due to
different foreign  shocks  over the relevant  sample  periods. For instance,  foreign  shocks  have
contributed  on average  to a 2.3% of GDP variation  of the public  sector deficit in Chile and to a
0.3% of GDP variation  in Zimbabwe. Countries  highly  sensitive  to terms of trade changes  are
Chile (copper), Mexico  (oil) and Thailand,  while in Colombia  (coffee and oil) and Morocco
(phosphates)  the average  contribution  of terms of trade shocks  to deficits  is only around 1% of
GDP. In Zimbabwe  the influence  of terms of trade shocks  on government  revenue is negligible.
By contrast to terms of trade shocks,  interest rate fluctuations  have much  lower  effects on public
deficits  - they  contribute at most 0.4% of GDP to the variation  of public  sector deficits  in our
sample.17
TABLE 2.1
CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN SHOCKS TO PUBLIC DEFICITS
(1)  (2)
Average Absolute  Average Relative
Variation of  Contribution of
Public Deficits  Fore40 Shocks to
Due to  Variation of
Forpig  Shocks  Public Defidct
(% of GDP)  (% of variation of
deficits)
1.  Chile. 1973-1988
Foreign Shocks  2.3  12
Copper Price Changes  2.7  iS
Foreig  Interest Rate Changes  0.4  -3
2.  Colombia, 1984-1989
Foreirn Shocks  1.0  50
Coffee  Fund Changes  1.2  59
Oil Co. Surplus Changes  0.9  -9
3.  Gha.  197731988
Foreig  lnteret  Rate Changes  0.1  0
4.  MoNaro. 1971-1988
Phosphate  Co. Contributions  0.8  .17
S. Thiland.  1970-198P
Terms  of Trade  Changes  2.2  41
6.  Zimbabwe, 1980/81-198,89
Foreip  Interest Rate Changes  0.3  .3
Note.  The first column computes the annual average absolute variation of the deficit caused by the corresponding changes  in forign
variabls  (Ihe  aception  is Chile, which prsents  period averages fot 1973-75, 1975-81,  1981-86,  and 1986-88). If more than one
foreign variable is considered, the sum of the average absolute variations for the individual  variables differs from the average absolute
variation of the combined shocks,  due to opposite signs of individual  variations  Tne second column reflects the average relative
'OR  t+4
contribution of forign  shocks to the variation of public defidts, defined as:  dvsig  d,) |  Id,|  where d  i  the
change in the defidt in period i, dv 1 is the change in the deficit caused by variable v, t is the initial period, and n+I  is the total number
of periods18
The average  relative  contribution  of foreign  shocks  in column  2 measures  the degreeoof -
correlation  between foreign-shock  induced  deficits  and the overall  public  deficit. In Chile,
Colombia,  and Thailand,  adverse  foreign  shocks  increase  deficits,  with shares  varying  between
12%  and 50%  of the total fluctuation  of deficits. In Ghana, the tiny foreign  interest shocks  are
uncorrelated  with deficits. However,  in Zimbabwe  and Morocco  foreign  shocks  have the opposite
sign  of the changes  of overali  deficits,  indicating  that domestic  macroeconomic  shocks  and fiscal
policy  changes  more than compensate  for the influence  of adverse  foreign  shocks.
Even moderate  shocks  could  explain  a lot of deficit  variation. In Colombia,  for example,
shocks  of moderate  magnitude  have  a huge influence  (50%)  on the variability  of deficits.
Colombia  did not require  such substantial  fiscal  adjustment  during the relevant  sample  period
(1984-89),  so that foreign  shocks  had a more significant  role in its deficit  evolution. However,  in
Chile,  which shows  the highest  magnitude  of foreign  shocks,  their relative  contribution  to deficit
variability  has been low (12%). Chile embarked  during 1973-88  on massive  fscal adjustment
programs  which  overshadowed  the influence  of foreign  shocks.
Optimal  responses  to shocks  depend on their transitory/permanent  nature: purely
transitory  shocks  should be (dis) saved  and hence reflected  by public  deficits,  while  permanent
shocks  should  induce  corresponding  changes  in expenditure  or revenue  without affecting  deficits.
In the case of public  sectors  which  own large commodity-exporting  companies  (Morocco,  Chile,
Mexico)  or collect  large revenues from private  exporters  (Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire),  price or
revenue-stabilization  funds (such as those implemented  in Chile and Venezuela)  or hedging
through risk-sharing  contracts are efficient  mechanisms  for isolating  the budget from transitory
export price shocksL19
C. Sensitivity  of Deficits  to Domestic  Macroeconomic  Variables
A second  group of variables  affecting  deficits  -- still  outside the direct control  of fiscal
policymakers  -- are domestic  macroeconomic  variables. In the following,  we concentrate  on those
variables  which  have the strongest  effects  on public  budgets: inflation,  the real interest rate, the
real exchange  rate, and growth.
Inflation
Inflation  affects  the budget  deficits  through  various  channels." 4 Anticipated  inflation
affects  nominal  interest payments  to domestic  debt holders. Inflation  also  affects  the primary
deficit  (the Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi  effect)." 5 Tax collection  lags  in non-fully  indexed  tax systems
(for example,  nominally  fixed  excise  taxes) lead to declining  real revenue  when inflation  increases.
Inflation  also tends to lead to public  demoralization  and hence lower  tax compliance. However,  if
income  brackets are non-indexed,  higher  inflation  leads  to bracket creep and hence higher  direct
taxation. Real public  current expenditure  declines  with inflation  when public  wages  or transfers
are not indexed. While in many  countries  the net effect of inflation  is to increase  primary
deficits,  the budget  structure  could  conceivably  reverse  this effect.
Table 2.2 summarizes  the effects  of inflation  on public  deficits  in the sample  countries,
identifying  the channels  through  which  they  operate.'  Results from estimated  tax
14  The channes mentioned  below add bracket creep  and transfer  effects to the fivc-item  list of Dombusch, Sturzenegger.  and Wolf
(1990).
Is See Oliv  (1967), and Tanzi (1977, 1978).  Sometimes  the Keynes-OlhverTanzi  effect is used more resuictively  for the tax
erosion  effect mentined below
MmTbe  effec of ination  on deficits via nominal interest payments on the debt is ecxcuded  ftrm table 2.3.1 as a separate  channel  of20
TABLE22
INFLATION AND PUBLIC DEFICITS
1.  Effects of Inflation on Tax Revenue:
1.1  Negative  1.2 Zero  1.3 Positive. Due to Non-
Indexation of Income
Brackets
Colombia: T  Chile:  DT, IT  Zimbabwe:  DT
(1972-1987)  (1973-1989)  (1970171-1988/89)
Ghana:  DT, IT  Morocco:  T
(1970171-1988)




2.  Effects of Inflation on Public Expenditure:
2.1 Negative  2.2  Zero
Chile:  Transfers  Morocco:  Public Expenditure
(1973-1989)
3.  Effects of Inflation on Public Deficit:
Positive Effect of Inflation on CNFPS Deficit
Thailand (1971-88)
Note:  DT is direct tax revenue, IT is indirect tax revenue, TT is trade tax revenue, and T is total
tax revenue.21
revenue functions  allow  us to classify  countries  according  to the net influence  of inflation  on tax
revenue. Inflation  lowers  taxes  in Colombia  (for aggregate  tax revenue)  and in Ghana (for both
direct and indirect  taxes). The only positive  effect  of inflation  on taxes is found for direct tax
revenue in Zimbabwe,  where non-indexation  of income  brackets  leads to bracket creep.  Short
collection  lags,  indexation  of trx revenue and/or indexation  of income  brackets  could be behind
the non-significant  effects  of inflation  on tax revenue in the other 4 cases:  Chile (direct and
indirect  taxes),  Morocco  (total taxes),  Pakistan  (direct, indirect,  and trade taxes),  and Zimbabwe
(indirect  and direct taxes).
Some  partial evidence  on the effects  of inflation  on expenditure  categories  follows  in
Table 2.2. Transfers  to the private  sector in Chile decline  with inflation,  presumably  due to
incomplete  indexation,  while no evidence  of a significant  effect  of inflation  on aggregate  public
expenditure  could be found in Morocco.
In most countries,  the net influence  of inflation  is to raise nominal  public  sector deficits,
due to the dominance  of the interest payment  and tax reduction  effects  of rising  prices. An
example  is Thailand:  according  to econometric  resalts a 10 pp. increase  in inflation  raises  the
CNFPS  deficit  by 0.9 pp. of GDP." 7
Real Interest Rate
Real interest payments  (and hence both the nominal  and the operational  deficit)  obviously
increase  one-to-one  with the real interest rate. Inflation  shocks  which  are unexpected  (or, even if
expected,  are not reflected  by higher nominal  interest rates due to interest controls),  reduce ex-
t7Cakulation  based  on a reduced-form  equation  estimated  for  the CNFPS  deficit  in radiand and on 1988  deficit,  inflaim and
GDP  leveL22
post real interest rates and hence the operational  deficit. For instance,  in Ghana the one-period
inflation  rise from 30% in 1982  to 115%  in 1983  increased  the nominal  CNFPS  deficit only
slightly  but reduced  the operational  deficit  significantly  due to the drop in ex-post  real interest
rates to negative  levels.
Financial  liberalization  since the mid-1970s,  with partial  or complete  deregulation  of
interest rates, has increased  the sensitivity  of deficits  to interest rate.  After early and radical
financial  liberalizations  in Chile (1974-75)  and Argentina  (1977),  the 1980s  saw partial or
complete  liberalizations  in Mexico,  Morocco,  and Zimbabwe. While  the massive  rise in real
interest rates during the 1970s  in Chile  did not impinge  on the deficit  due to the virtual  absence
of domestic  interest-bearing  debt, the increasing  domestic  debt stocks  of the 1980s,  in conjunction
with moderately  high interest rates, added to the burden of the central bank,  which  holds  most of
the public  sector domestic  debt. In Morocco,  partial liberalization  of interest rates since 1984  has
increased  significantly  the cost of domestic  debt to the Treasury. It is estimated  that a future
increase  of rates on government  debt to competitive  market levels  could add 2 pp. of GDP to the
deficit.
Less access  to foreign  financing  after 1982  caused  many  countries  to combine  deficit
reduction  with increased  domestic  financing.  A case in point is Pakistan. After 1981/82  its
government  decided  to raise its domestic  non-bank  borrowing,  which  contributed 1.5 pp. of the
increase  in the nominal  deficit,  from 4.8%  of GDP in 1980/81  to 7.4% in 1987/88,  through  higher
domestic  interest payments.23
Real Exchange  Rate
A real depreciation  raises  public  expenditure  (measured  in local currency  units)  by
increasing  foreign  interest payments  and the cost of traded-goods  capital and intermediate  gcods
acquired  by the public  sector. Public  sector revenue is boosted  by a real depreciation  from higher
surpluses  of traded-goods  producing  firms  and from direct  and indirect  taxation  on production  or
sales of traded  goods. The net effect  of the real exchange  rate (RER) on the deficit  (in real
terms or as a share of GDP) hence depends  on the relative  weights  of traded and ncn-traded
items in public  expenditure  and revenue.
Table 2.3 summarizes  the effects  of the RER on tax revenue,  SOE profits,  transfers  and
consolidated  deficits.' 6 In Colombia,  total tax revenue  was reduced by real devaluation  --
presumably  because of the negative  correlation  between the RER and quantitative  import
restrictions  or because of a highly elastic import  demand. The opposite is true for Ghana and
Zimbabwe,  where  various  revenue categories  (direct and indirect  taxes in Ghana, direct and trade
taxes in Zimbabwe)  are increased  by devaluation  -- presumably  because  traded-goods  activities
(sales  and production)  are taxed more heavily  than non-traded  activities. Because  the remaining
tax categories  are shown  to be insensitive  to the RER, aggregate  tax revenue rises with a higher
RER in the latter two countries.
Positive  effects  from real devaluations  on public  budgets  are reaped in countries  where a
significant  share of SOEs is comprised  by tradable-goods  producing  companies  - typically  the
case where the big commodity  exporters  are public  enterprises  - Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  and
18  be rel exchange  rate  is defined  here consistent  with  the relatie pnce of traded  to non-traded  goods - a real  deprecaiuo
means  a higher  RER.24
Morocco. Devaluations  also boost net revenues  from profits  of agricultural  marketing  boards  -
this is clearly  the case in Cote d'Ivoire.
A computation  of the net effect of the RER on the CNFPS  deficit  combines  the above
mentioned  effects  on public  revenue with the large and positive  effect of the RER on foreign
interest payments  and with any effects  on public  expenditure. In many  of our sample  countries,
the interest effect dominates  whatever  positive  effect the RER has on the primary  deficit. Tbe
exceptions  are Colombia,  where the RER effect  is zero, and Mexico,  where the share of oil-
related federal revenue  in GDP (7.9%  in 1989)  is more than twice  as large as interest payments
on dollar-denominated  debt (3.4%  in 1989).
Outout
Transitory  output shocks  affect non-financial  public  deficits  because of changing  tax bases
and transfer  payments  to the private sector. This anticyclical  behavior  of public  deficits  motivated
traditional  Keynesian  prescriptions  of using  the budget  as an automatic  stabilizer  to counteract
"autonomous"  demand  shocks. In countries  with non-independent  central  banks or under extreme
financial  crises,  the anti-cyclical  behavior  of the non-financial  deficit is reinforced  by anticycical
quasi-fiscal  operations  of the financial  public  sector, as we discuss  below.
Trend growth  is sometimes  seen as a cure to public  deficits  - if growth  is high enough,  it
is argued,  tax bases expand  and hence countries  can grow  out of deficits. This view is flawed  due
to two reasons. Fust, it neglects  the fact that not only tax bases but also successful  pressures  for
higher  public  expenditure  rise with output levels. Second,  growth  will not materialize  if public
deficits  are high,  inflation  and real interest rates are high,  and hence private investment  is
depressed.25
Table 2.3
Real Exchange Rate and Public Deficits
1.  Effects of a RER Devalu:tion on Tax Revenue:
1.1 Negative  1.2 Positive




2.  Positive Effects of a RER Devaluation on Profits
or Transfers from SOEs:
Chile:  Surplus of SOEs and Copper Taxes
Colombia:  Surplus of Coffee Fund and State Oil Company
Cote D'Ivoire:  Revenue from Cocoa/Coffee Marketing Board
Mexico:  Surplus of SOE
Morocco:  Contributions of State Phosphate Company
3.  Net Effect of the RER Devaluation on the CNFPS Deficit:
3.1  Increases Deficit  3.2  Close to Zero  3.3  Lowers Deficit
Chile  Colombia  Mexico
Ghana  Thailand (sns)
Zimbabwe (nns)
Note:  T is total tax revenue, DT is direct tax revenue, IT is indirect tax revenue, and TT is trade
tax revenue; sns is statistically not significant and nns is numerically not significant.26
An Iglustration 
How sensitive  are deficits  to domestic  variables? Table 2.4 presents the case of
Zimbabwe,  showing  by how  much the CNFPS  deficit  is affected  by normalized  changes  in
macroeconomic  determinants. The domestic  real interest rate has a significant  effect on the
deficit,  resulting  from the high level  of public  debt: a 1 pp. increase  in the rate raises  the deficit
by 0.4 pp. of GDP, reflecting  the 0.40  domestic  debt/GDP ratio.  Interestingly,  inflation  has a
lower  positive  e'ffebt  on the deficit  than the real interest rate; the reason being that the 0.40
effect on the deficit  via higher nominal  interest payments  of a 1 pp. rise in inflation  is neutralized
in part by the positive  bracket-creep  effect on income  taxation. A devaluation  contributes  to a
slightly  lower  deficit  in Zimbabwe;  the higher foreign  interest payments  are more than
compensatrd  by increased  tax collection. Finally,  growth  seems to have a strong  effect on deficits;
however,  its magnitude  is overestimated  because it considers  or  the influence  of GDP on tax
revenue,  not on public.  expenditure.
D.  Fiscal  Policies
In this subsection,  we compare  the role of fiscal  policy  variables  to the influence  of foreign
and domestic  macro  variables  in the evolution  of public  deficits. Based  on time-series  results  for
the decomposition  of public  sector deficits  according  to the three groups  of deficit
determinants,' we compute the contribution  of each of these groups  to changes  in public
deficits. Figure 2.2 presents  the average  relative  contnbution  of the three groups  of variables  to
I%ed  on the defict dempoition  methodolog  by Mansail and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989).27
Table 2.4
SENSITIVITY OF NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS TO
CHANGES IN MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS: ZIMBABWE 1988
Changes in Macro Determinants  Changes in NFPS Deficits
(Percent. Points of GDP)
1 pp. Increase of Domestic Inflation  0.31
1 pp. Increase of Domestic Real Interest Rate  0.40
1 % Devaluation of Real Exchange Rate  -0.06i
1 % Growth of Real GDP  -0.37
1 pp. Increase of Foreign Interest Rate  0.25
Note: based on 1987/88 and 1988/89 CNFPS budgets.
changes in CNFPS deficits'  and the evolution of deficits over time in Chile, Ghana and
Zimbabwe.  This evolution reflects the influence of both transitory (or cyclical) shocks and,
201he  aveage relative contribution of each group  of deficit deteminants  is calculated  basd  on the equation presented in the note
to table 21; bence the equation  is now used separately for  aternal, domestic wacwcoomic  and fiscal policy  variable.  However, in
order to prent  the reative contribution of each group of variables,  d  is defined here  a the eaplained change  in the deficit, not the
actual change  as  in table 2.1.  Hence the average  relative contribution of estemal  variables to actual defcits in column 2, table  2.1,
diffea  from the average relative contribution  of external variables to cxplained dficits  in figure  22.  The average  absolute deviationt
betwee  actual and explained  deficit changes  in pp. of GDP are 0.9 for Chile (197448), 2.0 for Ghana (197V3M1988),  and 1.4 for
Zimbabwe (1981182-198M89).Figure 2.2
Nominal Consolidated Non-Financial Public Sector Deficits
and Deficit  Decomposition According to Main
Determinants in Three Countries: 1971-1989
(Central Government  Deficits for Ghana)
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particularly in the cases of Chile and Ghana, structural policy shifts resulting in lower trend
deficits.
Chile's 1973-89  fiscal experience reveals four distinct periods: a first massive fiscal
stabilization (1973-76), consolidation of public sector retrenchment (1977.80), crisis and deficit
explosion (1981-84), and a second significant fiscal stabilization (1985-89). Fiscal policy makers
are the main actors behind this experience, dominated by achieving CNFPS surpluses in the
neighborhood of 5% of GDP.  On average, the relative contribution of fiscal policy variables
(FPV) to changes (and therefore to trend reduction) in the deficit is 142%.  Hence changes in
fiscal policy variables compensated for the strongly negative contribution of domestic
macroeconomic variables (DV) and the slightly negative contribution of external variables (EV).
Ghana  is a case of gradual but also highly  successful fiscal adjustment. 2"  The contribution
of fiscal policy variables to this tum-around is also massive,  explaining 92% of the change in the
deficit.  Improvements in domestic macro variables helped to a small extent, contributing by 9%
to the fluctuations and structural correction of the central govemment deficit in Ghana.
Zimbabwe shows a substantial deterioration  in its CNFPS budget after 1980, which is
partly reversed when a limited fiscal stabilization started in 1987/88. Zimbabwean policy makers
compensated for the influence of variables beyond their control: fiscal policy variables explain
110o  of tne variation of public deficits, neutralizing the negative contnbution of foreign interest
shocks to the deficit.
A central conclusion emerges from these three cases: fiscal policy variables dominate
absolutely these countries' experiences of fiscal adjustment or deterioration.  External and
nTh.  gps  for Ghan  for the 1971-1981  sub-period are fiasI-year data for 197172 - 1981A12  and those for Zimbabwe are for
fl  y  tbougout  1980198&30
domestic  macroeconomic  shocks  play  a minor,  and often even negative,  role in the cyclical
variation  and structural  changes  of public  sector budgets. Hence active  fiscal  policies  are both the
main  culprit in fiscal  crises  and an effective  instrument  in bringing  about fiscal  stabilization  and
adjustment.
Which  were the main fiscal  policy  instruments  for achieving  fiscal  adjustment  or causing
public  sector deterioration  in these three and the other seven countries? Table 2.5 identifies  the
contribution  of specific  policies  in 10 relevant  country  experiences,  one for each of our sample
countries. Three cases  (Chile,  Mexico,  Thailand)  correspond  to strong and fast fiscal  adjustment,
four follow  a more gradualist  approach  of fiscal  retrenchment  (Colombia,  Ghana, Morocco,
Zimbabwe),  one case is of moderate  deterioration  (Pakistan),  and two of massive  fiscal
deterioration  (Argentina,  Cote D'Ivoire).
Loss  of control of public  consumption  (particularly  wages  and employment  levels)  is a
major  cause of a loosened fiscal  stance. Two dramatic  examples  for this are Argentina  (1977-82),
where the increase  in current expenditure  was so massive  that capital investment  had to fall by
almost  5 pp. of GDP during this period of extreme  fiscal  deterioration,  and Zimbabwe,  which
during  a period of fiscal  retrenchment  (1986/87-1988/89)  was not able to avoid  further increases  in
its public  wage  bill amounting  to 4.0 pp. of GDP. Also, part of C6te d'Ivoire's  massive  fiscal
deterioration  is due to rising  current expenditure. Conversely,  the examples  of strong  austerity
policies  in Chile (1973-75),  Ghana (1975/76-1988),  Mexico  (1986-89),  and Thailand  (1985-88)
illustrate  the important  role played  by current expenditure  reduction,  and, in particular,  by cuts in
wages  and public  employment.31
Table 2.5
CONTRIBUTION OF POLICIES TO COUNTRY EXPERIENCES
OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT OR DETERIORATION
(Percentage Points of GDP)
Countly Experience  Start and End-of-  Change in Deficit and Contribution
Period Deficit Levels  of Fiscal Policy Changes
1.  Argentina:  4.7; 15.1  Change in Deficit  +10.4
1977-82  Higher Current Exp.  15.1
Deterioration  Lower Capital Exp.  -4.7
2.  Chile:  20.6; 2.1  Change in Deficit  -18.5
1973-75  Adjustment  Lower Public Employment  -4.3
Higher Rev from Tax Ref.  -10.5
Higher SOE Oper. Surplus  -8.4
3.  Colombia:  6.3; 2.2  Change in Deficit  -4.1
1984-89  Adjustment  Lower Pub. Wages/Salaries  -1.2
Lower Fixed Investment  -2.1
Higher Tax Revenue  -2.1
Higher SOE Oper. Surplus  -1.9
4.  Cote D'Ivoire:  1.7;14.4  Change in Deficit  +12.7
1984-89  Higher Current Exp.  3.6
Deterioration  Lower Current Exp.  -5.1
Lower Tax Revenue  2.9
Lower Rev. Commodity Fund  12.7
5.  Ghana:  15.1; -0.4  Change in Deficit  -15.5
1976/76-88  Adjust.  Lower Wage Bill  -1.3
Lower Exp. on Goods/Serv.  -1.6
Lower Transfers/Subsidies  -5.4
Lower Public Investment  -1.8
Higher Grants/Non-Tax Rev.  ?32
6.  Mexico:  14.9; 5.1  Change in Deficit  -9.8
1986-89  Adjustment  Lower Current Expenditure  -2.5
Lower Other Expenditure  -4.6
Lower Public Investment  -0.7
Higher Direct Tax Revenue  -3.0
Higher VAT Revenue  -0.9
7.  Morocco:  12.1; 4.1  Change in Deficit  -8.0
1983-88  Adjustment  Lower Exp. on Goods/Serv.  -2.9
Lower Transfers/Subsidies  -1.7
Lower Capital Expenditure  .3.3
New Petroleum Levy  -3.4
8.  Pakistan  4.8; 8.3  Change in Deficit  +3.5
1980/81-1986/87  Higher Non-Int. Cur. Exp.  +2.9
Deterioration  Lower Direct Tax Revenue  +0.8
Lower Indirect Tax Reven.  + 1.9
9.  Thailand:  8.6; -0.2  Change in Deficit  -8.8
1986-88  Adjustment  Lower Pub. Wages/Sals.  -1.4
Lower Public Investment  -3.5
Higher Revenue  -2.2
10. Zimbabwe:  14.4; 10.0  Change in Deficit  4.4
1986/87-1988/89  Higher Pub. Wages/Sals.  +4.0
Adjustment  Lower Transfers/Subsidies  -5.0
1988 Direct Tax Reform  -2.4
I  1988 Custom Duty Reform  -1.8
Note:  The data refers to the central government for Ghana and Morocco, and to the general
government for Pakistan.  In all other cases the data refers to the CNFPS.33
Cutting  transfers  and subsidies  is often an effective  way  to contribute  both to fiscal
stabilization  and market deregulation. In Ghana and Zimbabwe  lower  transfers/subsidies
contributed  massively  to deficit  reduction,  by 5.4 and 5.0 pp. of GDP, respectively.  On the
revenue side, tax reforms  are at the heart of addressing  structural  deficits. In Chile,  direct and
VAT tax reforms  brought  in a staggering  10.5  pp. of GDP, while  the 1988  Zimbabwe  tax reforms
rendered a significant  4.2 pp. of GDP. Higher  tax revenue helped  also Colombia,  Mexico,  and
Thailand  in reducing  their deficits.1
Rationalization  of public  enterprises  and reforms  of agricultural  marketing  boards
constitute  the fourth element of successful  stabilization  in our 10-country  sample. Higher
operating  surpluses  of SOEs  contributed  significantly  to improving  structural  deficits  in three
countries:  in Chile by a dramatic  8.4 pp. of GDP, in Colombia  and in Ghana by smaller  amounts.
Conversely,  the dramatic  deterioration  in CMte  d'Ivoire  was caused  by the decline  in revenue from
the cocoa and coffee  revenue stabilization  fund due to continuing  producer price supports  during
a period of declining  world prices.
An encouraging  rmding  from our sample  is that successful  fiscal  retrenchment  does not
have to rely on lower  public  investment. In the most dramatic  fiscal  turnaround  (Chile, 1973-75),
public  capital formation  was not reduced. In the three countries  where public  investment  fell
during fiscal adjustment -- Colombia, Ghana, and Mexico -- it was reduced by moderate amounts.
Only  one case of fiscal  retrenchment  - Thailand  - relied heavily  on cutting  public  investment.
Conversely,  the two most  dramatic  declines  in public  investment  occurred  in Cote d'Ivoire and in
Argentina,  during periods  of public  deficit  explosion. In the latter case, public  capital  expenditure
220  thee  two cam it was not pomble to separate  the effecs of ta  reforms  from those arming  from  Chang  in marnic
vuables affecting tax mvenue.34
continued  its systematic  decline  beyond 1982,  reaching  a 30-year  trough in the latest  year with
available  data (6.1%  of GDP in 1987).
We conclude  that successful,  i.e. sustainable,  non-financial  public  sector adjustment
typically  requires acting  simultaneously  on four fronts:  reducing  an overblown  government
bureaucracy,  cutting transfers  and subsidies  to the private  sector (other than efficient  and targeted
social  programs),  enacting  tax legislation  for increased,  broadly-based  direct and indirect  taxation,
and reforming  and/or privatizing  public  enterprises. Efficient  public  investment,  particularly  in
social  or physical  infrastructure,  should  not only be exempted  from fiscal  cuts but possibly
expanded  to encourage  economic  growth.
E.  Quasi-Fiscal  Deficits
Quasi-fiscal  deficits  (QFDs)  - expenses  or losses  incurred  by public  financial  institutions  --
are an exclusively  Latin American  phenomenon  in our sample. They reflect a subordination  of
public  financial  institutions  - in particular  of the central bank - to the ministry  of finance. They
involve  transfers  to public  non-financial  or financial  institutions  outside the central  government
(such as development  banks in Argentina  or Mexico  or provincial  governments  in Argentina),  to
private financial  institutions  (such as technically  bankrupt commercial  banks in Argentina  and
Chile),  or to the non-financial  private sector (like private  exporters  or debtors in Chile).
QFDs grow  at times of domestic  financial  and external  payments  crises  due to support to
distressed  financial  institutions  and domestic  debtors burdened  by foreign-currency  denominated
external liabilities. In Argentina  and Chile  quasi-fiscal  expenditures  of the Central Bank resulted
from emergency  loans to financial  institutions  and losses  from exchange  rate guarantee programs.
5,vm  the trm  ts ot Teijeiro  (1969)  and  Robnion  and Steila  (1988).35
The bailing  out of domestic  financial  institutions  between 1982  and 1987  in Chile was based  on.
three subsidized  programs:  emergency  loans to financial  institutions  liquidated  in 1981,  purchase
of commercial  banks'  bad loans  with repurchase  commitment,  and rescheduling  of bank debtors.
Losses  from exchange  rate insurance  programs  were incurred  by the Central Bank  of Chile due to
three sources:  exchange  rate subsidies  to domestic  debtors of dollar-denominated  external  debt,
exchange  rate insurance  to exporters,  and capital  losses  on foreign  liabilities  of the financial
system  due to exchange  rate devaluations.  In Mexico,  QFDs were due to rinancial  subsidies
granted by development  banks as well  as the transfer  of bad debts of all levels  of government  to
the federal government,  with no additional  data on central bank losses. 24
QFDs can be of massive  proportions  during  years  of financial  and external  crises  in
countries  with weak public  financial  institutions. QFDs of the central bank amounted  to a
cumulative  55.0%  of GDP during 1982-85  in Argentina  and to a 41.1%  of GDP during the same
period in Chile. Figure 2.3 compares  the size of QFDs to CNFPS  deficits  in Argentina,  Chile,
and Mexico. In Argentina,  QFDs are roughly  the same as CNFPS  deficits  during 1982-1985,  the
sum of both exceeding  on average  25% of GDP per year!'  In Chile,  QFDs exceeded  an
average  10% of GDP per year during 1982-85,  more than doubling  CNFPS  deficits.
Both countries  illustrate  how  misleading  non-financial  public  sector deficits  can be. For
instance,  while CNFPS  deficits  are falling  during 1984  in Argentina,  a strong deterioration  in the
fiscal  stance  of the overall  public  sector, including  the central  bank, is apparent from figure
24  lb  list of quasi-fial  operations  include both cash  and accrued losse,  as well a  tunfen  of aets  of ex-ante unknown value.
Some etimations, like the one for Chne (based on Byzaguirre  and Larmnaga,  1990) attempt to reconcile stock and flow  mcaur  by
caru*j  out  x-post calulations  based on loan rewvery.
25  No data on QFDo is available  after 1985 for Argentina.36
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2.3.  In Chile, CNFPS deficits underestimate both the 1981-85  fiscal crisis and subsequent fiscal
adjustment. 2'  In Mexico, QFDs are a relatively stab'e share of financial subsidies and bad loans
hovering at around 1% of GDP.
F.  Sustainability  of Public Sector Deficits
After focusing on the determinants of above-the-line deficits in the preceding sub-sections,
we now look at below-the-line financing constraints of the deficits.  Our main question is: given
reasonable assumptions about macroeconomic variables and the behavior of public debt holders,
are current deficit levels in the sample countries sustainable?  Following the
initial work by Buiter (1983, 1985, 1987) and van Wijnbergen (1989), and couritty applications
such as those by van Wijnbergen, Anand and Rocha (1988) to Turkey, Buiter and Patel (1990) to
India, and De Melo (1990) to Morocco, we define sustainable deficit levels as those consistent
with stable public sector debt to output ratios.'  Appendix IV presents an expression for the
primary public sector surplus, on which the sustainable surplus (or deficit) calculations are based.
Figure 2.4 compares sustainable and actual primary surplus levels for five relevant fiscal
experiences during the 1980s. In two cases (Chile and Zimbabwe), upper and lower bounds,
consistent with possible deviations of the relevant macroeconomic  variables'  from base-case
levels, are added to the mid-point estimates.
2dn fact, QFDs in Chile start to revers their sign in 1986,  when small profits are made from the commercial  banh  rpurchases of
bad  oanm  sold to the Central Bank during the financial  crisis  Hence QFDs were limoited  in Chile to the 1982.85  crisis pefiod.
27Wbich  could be either current debt ratios or those deemed to be consistent with stable ceditor  portfolis  This is related to the
concept of solveny (Buiter (1987)).
2 They are the reevant variables determining the primary deficit (see appendix IV, equation (2)): the rates  of income growtb,
inflation,  domestic and foreign real interest, and real echange  te devaluation38
Figure  2.4
ACTUAL  AND  SUSTAINABLE  PUBLIC  SECTOR PRIMARY  SURPLUSES
Chile
Consolidated Total Public Sector Primary Surplus
%  of (OP
-10.0  /
1962  19.3  1964  taos  toes  1967  1JO  las19
CZonsolidated  Non-Financial Pubiie S0etor Primary Surplus
%  of GOP





1963  1061969664  190  1967  1080  1960
Morooo





















1983/64  1984/85  198086  1966/87  1987/88
Zimbabwe
Total  Public  Soctor  Primary  Surplus




- 1 .7  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _





1963/84  1984/85  1986/8a  1986/87  1987/88  196{/89
Figure 2.4 Legend
- Actual  Primary  Suelus
- Suetalnable  Prlmary  Surplu  (Midgot)t
.*-  Upper  and Loww  Bound  Ibet  fiebls PrImary  SiWRIu4
Suetalnable  Prlemay  SurpluS  with SU-oi4fP
Annual  Reducto n  pubilb debtIGOP  rfall40
Sustainable  primary  surplus  levels  diverge  widely,  not only due to different  levels  of public.
liability  stocks  and macroeconomic  variables  in each country,  but also because  the calculations
were made for different  public  sector coverage. They range from 1.4%  of GDP for the total
public  sector in Chile to -2.8%  of GDP (a sustainable  primary  deficit)  in Morocco. In the latter
case 2', if current public  debt levels  are reduced by 25 pp. of GDP during  5 initial  years,  Morocco
would  have to generate a primary  surplus  of 2.2% of GDP during the transitory  phase  of debt
amortization.
Chile's  massive  public  sector adjustment  during the 1980s  (comprising  both the non-
financial  deficit and the central bank's  quasi-fiscal  losses)  pushed its primary  surpluses  in 1988-89
well  beyond  the upper bound of sustainable  levels. Colombia  reached  sustainable  primary  surplus
levels  in 1987-89  after strengthening  significantly  its fiscal  stance. Morocco  also pursued  strong
fiscal  adjustment  policies,  resulting  in a 1988  primary  surplus  level  which  is beyond  what is needed
for declining  public  debt to output shares,  although.  subsequently  its fiscal  stance  deteriorated
somewhat. Pakistan's  fiscal  deterioration  raised  its primary  deficits  beyond  the 1.7%  of GDP level
consistent  with stable debt to output ratios. Finally,  Zimbabwe's  modest  fiscal  adjustment  in 1987-
89 reduced its primary  deficit to within  the broad range of values consistent  with  sustainable
levels,  but still is distant from an upper-bound  level  of sustainable  primary  surplus  consistent  with
an adverse  macroeconomic  scenario.
Although  these calculations  are based  on simple  assumptions,  they provide  useful
benchmarks  for evaluating  fiscal  stance from a longer-run  perspective. The next section  focuses
on the macroeconomic  implications  of short-term  fiscal  adjustment,  relaxing  the assumption  of
exogenous  inflation  and interest rates embedded  in the previous  exercises.
2  'Ibe  Morocco  mults we  takn from de Melo  (1990),  while  the  other four wuntry  calculations  arm  those  of the  ca  studi.e41
m.  DEFICITS, INFLATION,  AND REAL INTEREST RATES
A.  FLscal  deficits and inflation: evidence from the case studies
Any notion that fiscal deficits and inflation display a simple relationship conspicuously fails
-- as was noted in table 1.1, the simple cornelation coefficient is only .16. There are two reasons
why the relationship fails. One is that countries make different choices on printing money
("seignorage")  to finance the deficit, partly because they differ in the extent to which other means
of finance are available.'  The case studies identitied a number of nonmonetary sources of
finance in the low-inflation,  high-deficit countries.  For example, Zimbabwe has access to a deep
pool of domestic saving, some of it involuntary because of import rationing.  Morocco also
financed the deficit with cheap domestic debt finance.  Pakistan had access to extensive
concessional external finance.  C6te d'Ivoire is a special case because the adherence to the Franc
Zone effectively eliminates printing money as a means of financing. However, in all of these
cases, the studies suggest that deficits cannot continue at past levels without sooner or later
spllng  over into inflation, as cheap sources of finance are being exhausted or exchange rate
regimes prove unsustainable.
The second reason why the deficit inflation relationship fails is that money creation and
inflation are nonlinearly related.  Figure 3.1 shows a scatter of inflation and seignorage revenue.
The scatter suggests a conventional "Laffer curve' relationship between the inflation rate and
seignorage revenue, with revenue falling off at some point because of the elastic response of
money demand.  Econometric estimation of a quadratic equation statistically  confirms the 'Laffer
3A similar  pdint is made  in Fsr  and Eaer  (1990), which also makas  the point  that the powth rate affects  whether dfiats
au infltionary.42
Figure  3.1
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curve." 31 The exact  maximum  of the curve  is sensitive  to the inclusion  of the extreme points  -
with Argentina,  the maximum  is at 160%  inflation,  while  without  Argentina,  it is only at 68%.
These cross-section  results  differ drastically  from calculations  of revenue-maximizing
inflation  from individual  time-series  results  for the case  studies.' 2 A regularity  is that high-
inflation  countries  allegedly  have  very high seignorage-maximizing  inflation  rates -- in Argentina  it
is 966%,  in Chile 792%,  and in Ghana 125% -- moderate  inflation  countries  find more moderate
maximizing  rates -- Colombia's is 80% -- and low inflation countries have low maximizing  inflation
rates -- Thailand's  is only  4%!  One hypothesis  to explain  this is misspecification  of money
demand  as having  a constant semi-elasticity  with respect to inflation  (the Cagan function),  when
in fact the semi-elasticity  fails  in response  to inflation.
Appendix  I shows  how  a plausible  theoretical  model,  in which  interest-bearing  liquid  assets
can be substituted  for money  in transactions,  implies  a falling  semi-elasticity  of money  demand
with respect to inflation. 33 If the elasticity  of substitution  between  interest-bearing  assets and
money  in transactions  is greater than one, then a "Laffer  curve"  exists  with a limit  on maximum
seignorage.'4  If this is the "true"  mcney  demand,  then the seignorage-maximizing  inflation  rate
will  be overestimated  in high inflation  countries  when a constant semi-elasticity  of money  demand
is assumed  --  because  the low  semi-elasticity  of money  demand  in high inflation  countries  is taken
3tW  esimated the folloving cro-section  relationship (t-statistics in parenthes):
S  - 010  + .043x  - .01303i 2
Y  (4.9)  (4.1)  (2.31)
Wbere SJY is averge seignorage revenue  to GDP 1970-89,  and x  is average  inflation 197089.  There wae  49 obsrtions  and
the R' w  .44. ITe  quadratic term is still significant  even if Argentina is edcluded.
32Bairo (1990) also suggests  that the nmaimum  of the Laffer curve is at inflation rates  around 100%.
33Dornbusch,  Sturzener.  and Wolf (1990) describe the progressive  substitution of interest-bearing asets  for money in high-
infltion  episodeL
34edwards  and Tabeiini (1990) prent  suggestive  evidence for seignorage Laffer curvs  in a number of developing  countues44
as inevitable  rather than seen as a consequence  of the high inflation. Similarly,  the seignorage-
maximizing  inflation  rate will  be underestimated  in low  inflation  countries  if the high semi.
elasticity  observed  there is treated as fLxed,  instead  of recognized  as falling  as inflation  rises. The
cross-section  result of seignorage  maximizing  inflation  being  between 68 and 160%  is closer to the
truth than the case study results.
The case studies  all find rather unfavorable  tradeoffs  between inflation  and seignorage
revenue. The amount  of additional  inflation  required to achieve  another percentage  point of
GDP in long-run  seignorage  revenue is 15 percentage  points in Colombia,  20 in Ghana, between
7.5 and 26 in Morocco,  50 in Chile,  and 97 percentage  points in Argentina -- the tradeoff  worsens
as the average  inflation  rate rises. Given the unfavorable  tradeoff and the widespread  consensus
on the undesirability  of inflation,  it is hard to believe  that revenue motivations  alone explain  the
persistence  of inflation  in the high inflation  countries."
B.  Steady-state  seipnorage  versus one-shot  seignorage  episodes
Given  the attention devoted to seignorage  in the literature,  it is easy to forget how  small it
is as a source  of revenue. Table 3.1 shows  the average  seignorage  for a sample  of developed  and
developing  countries  for which  the data is available. Seignorage  is calculated  as the ratio to real
GDP of the yearly  sum of deflated monthly  changes  in the money  base. The generally  small
amount  of scignorage  for the ten case  studies is typical  of the overall pattern of seignorage  among
all countries.  The maximum  amount of average  seignorage  revenue over an extended  time is less
than 5 percent of GDP.  Seignorage  is also mainly  a phenomenon  of developing  countries  - only
35imUr conlduuos  are rched  by Bit*er  and livistan  (1987) and Kiguel and Liviatan  (1968).  A  arge literatur on optimal
seionoge  (ceg Mankiw  (1987)) ha  found little support in developing  ountries (Edwards  and Tabelini (1990)).45
9  Spain,  Greece, and Italy had seignorage  above 1 percent of GDP among  industrial  countries,  and
the average  seignorage  is more than twice  as high in developing  countries. 3'
Seignorage  revenue is of the same order of magnitude  as revenue from individual  excise
taxes. Table  3.1 shows  revenue from individual  product  excise  taxes  and from seignorage  for 35
countries  in which  data on both are available  in 1985.37  Why then are macroeconomists  so
preoccupied  with taxes  on money  as compared  to taxes  on beer,  jute, and cigarettes?
Perhaps one reason is that seignorage  can be a large source  of temporary  revenue  during
times  of crisis. The time-series  averages  conceal  tremendous  year-to-year  fluctuations  in
seignorage. Figure  3.2 shows  a frequency  distribution  of the individual  yearly  observations  for the
same sample  of countries  as in Table 3.1. While  nearly  half the sample  is concentrated  in
observations  of less  than one percent of GDP, a significant  number  of observations  of high
seignorage  revenue exist,  reaching  as high as 13 percent of GDP. The average  time series
coefficient  of variation  in the sample  is 90 percent. 3'
This suggests  that a fruitful  approach  to seignorage  would  be the study  of episodes  of high
seignorage  to see how  they are achieved  and what their consequences  are.  A number  of the case
studies in this project include  such episodes  -- bursts of seignorage  appear in Ghana in 1978  and
1983,  in Chile under Allende in 1971,  in Mexico  in 1982,  and in Argentina  in 1975  and 1983.
3 Similar manitudes we  found in the study of Fscher (1982).
3 e poduct chosen  in each country  is the largest single  source  of  cis  tax revenue  in the Government Finance  Statistics.
Coedficient  of variation  is cakulated over 197089 for a reduced sample  of 26 countries with data  over  that period (in order to
utanda.zdie  the number  of obwvtions,  which  affects the variance). Coefficient  of variation  - standard deviation/mean.'46
Table 3.1
Average Segorage
Average  Largest  Excise
Country  SEzole  Tax
Tax%  1985  Product
Austra  0.9  1.0  Wine
BelCgum  0.5  1.1  Mineral  Oils
CaoadaA0.4  0.7  Gasoline
Denwau  0.4  1.1  Cigarettes
FInland  0.6  1.3  Fuel
France  0.6  0.4  Insurance
GCmny, Fedesal  Republic  0.7  13  Mineral  Oil
Oeooe  2.8  2.2  Fuel
Italy  2.2  1.7  Mineral  Oil
Japan  1.0  0.6  Liquor
Netherlands  0.6  0.8  Pe=roleum
No0way  0.6  15  Vehicle  Trafer
Spain  2.3  1.3  Petroleum
SWeden  0.6  1.0  Petrol  Fuel Oil
United  States  0.4  0.3  Motor  Vehicle  Fuels
Average OECD  1.0  1.1.
Db*uSm9  Con
Argentina  4.2  2.5  Fuel
_  h  1.0
Doilvi  2.9
Brazil  2.3  0.2  Electrcity
Burkia Fao  1.1  0.7  Beverages
Chile  3.7
Colombia  21  0.6  Gasoline
Cote dtIvore  1.3  1.1  Petroleum
Dominican  Republic  1.6  1.8  Petroleum
Ecuador  1.8  0.3  Beer
G%n=  3.1
Honduras  0.8  0.5  Beer
Indin  1.5  0.7  Testiles  and Jute




K:rea  1.6  0.8  Liquor
mah  zo
Mala  1.3  0.7  Petrol
Merico  3.1  1.4  Gasoline
Moroco  1.7  1.2  Tobacco
Nigeria  1.1
Pakita  2.0
Parguay  1.9  0.9  Fuel
Peru  3.6  4.1  Gasoline
Philipp  1.0
Sri  Lna1.3
Tailad  1.0  1.5  Petroleum  Products
Thalded  & Tobago  039
Turkey  3.4
Veneuela  1.5  0.5  u
Zaire  4.4  0.3  Toc
Zambia  20  1.9  Petroleum
Zimbabwe  1.1
Avera  eDvlopin  2.1  1.1
NOTES:  Seigonge is defind as the nominal  chane in the money  bm  e ch month  divided  by  the CPI  for that mtonth
Tbie  tyical method  of cakulating  the ratio of the noinal  chae  in the mone bae over  the entire  year  to the
uannu  minal GDP  ca  seuiIy  overstate  seigno  e  in bhigb  mflatin countrie.  Interest  paid  on reses
iould Ao  be subtracted  to get a true  estimate  of seignorage,  but the data  is garally  lcking. Few
develoin  countri  pay  intereu on resaves  Where  mterest  is paid it appan that  it is  quantitatively
ummphln_L An  impornt  aception is Argentin where  the combinmtion  of high  inflation  and interat oaid
on rmerv  ma  tbh ad uatment  vay important We  uwe  the Argentine  seignorage  r4ie  constructed  bjP
Rodruz  for this projecL  Periods  overed are geneally  1965.89  but vary  depending  on data  availability
(periods  ailable  on request).
SOURCE: Excise  tms  GCoenmet Fiance Statbtics,  IMF
Seigornge Money  Be  Statitics, IMF,  with  the eroeption  of Argentina  and Colombia  from  Cas  Studies  of
ths  Projeat47
Figure  3:2
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A different type  of one-shol7eignorage  took place in Ghdna. The government  captured 2.5
4
percent of GDP through a currency  conversion  and partial expropriation  of deposits  in 1979. In
1982,  the government  again expropriated  private wealth  through  the demonetization  of the largest
denomination  note (an example  recently  followed  by another crisis-ridden  economy,  the Soviet
Union). These episodes  brought  a short-term  gain to public  finances  at considerable  long-run
cost -- the Ghana case study  estimates  that seignorage  was permanently  lowered  by 1 to 2 percent
of GDP because  of the fall in money  demand  after the 1979  currency  expropriation.
Table 3.2 looks at characteristics  of episodes  of high (conventional)  seignorage  in the
broader sample. We identified  18 yearly  observations  (out of 1143)  in which  seignorage  was more
than 4 percentage  points above the average  seignorage  to GDP ratio in that country.'  We see
that 'spikes"  of high seignorage  are indeed  short-lived. All of the episodes  lasted only one year,
except for the Bolivian  hyperinflation  of 1982-84.  The episodes  are associated  with developing
countries  - of OECD countries,  only Denmark  indulged  in a seignorage  spike. One might have
thought that these bursts  of seignorage  revenue would  be associated  with accelerations  of
inflation. Surprisingly,  this hypothesis  is not confirmed  by the data. Of the 16 episodes  (treating
Bolivia  1982-84  as a single  episode),  only 9 of them showed  rising  inflation  -- roughly  the same
proportion  of rising  inflation  that exists  in the broader  sample. One might think that inflation
shows  a lagged  response,  but there is no evidence  for this, as the following  year's inflation  also
shows  no tendency  to accelerate. Of course,  some of the episodes  of rising  inflation  are quite
spectacular. Bolhiva  in 1982-84  and Peru in 1988  experienced  classic  hyperinflations,  in which  real
Tbe  ae  actually  21 such obwetions,  but 3 of them were found to involve  chnge  in measurement of money base, and were
dbadd49
Table  .2
EPISODES OF HIGH SEIGNORAGE SEIKW
(MORE TItAN 4 PERCENTAGE POINTS OF GDP ABOVE AVERAGE)
COMPONENIS  OF
SEIGNORAGE  SPIKE  (% of GDP)*  GROWIH  INFIATION  (Deember oa  December)
Year of  Seignoge  Average  Change  in  Above  Growih  Aveae  Inlion  Change  in  Averag Spike  Spike  Seignoage  Real Moner  Aveage  Year  of  Gtb  Year  Of  Inlutioa  Inflation (%g points  Bse  +  Inflation  Spke  Rate  Spike  Over  Ratc of GDP above  Above  Avg.  Tax  Previous  Yr avera)  Money  Base
Argentina  197S  9.0  42  -4.0  65  40.5  2.2  336.1  2962  10S.4
BWlt  19B2  7.5  2.9  -0.8  7.9  4.4  2.7  296.6  271.4  S4.5 1963  53  -33  &6  -6.5  327.8  31.3 1984  7.0  -3.9  20.8  1.0  2176.2  A848.4
Cile  1971  6.7  3.8  10.9  -3.0  9.1  1.5  19.4  -15.6  913
Denmark  1965  4.2  0.4  4.3  40.2  4.3  2.4  36  -2.0  7.7
Domiak  Rep.  1966  4.9  1.  5.3  0.6  3.0  5.7  65  -21.8  13.1 1968  5.7  2.2  3.0  1.3  57.5  32.5
Gh  1978  4.7  3.1  -0.6  3.8  9.8  1.7  168.5  -2.4  38.6
Jamak*  1964  S.4  1.9  4.7  1.0  -1.4  0.2  31.2  14.5  17.0
Mco  1982  7.9  3.1  1.4  3.7  -. 6  5.0  9.9  70.2  29.8
Pra  1985  6.7  3.6  2.7  2.5  2.2  2.2  1583  46.8  82.1 1968  60  -7.3  14.  -8.0  1722.1  1607.5
Thad  & Tobal. 1982  42  0.9  43  40.0  4.7  1.6  10  40.8  10.5
Zaie  1976  4.1  4A  0.5  2.2  -5.5  3.1  78.  42.1  47.1 1982  4.9  4.4  -0.6  40.4  41.0  -12.0 1967  5.7  4.1  4.1  0.6  106.5  682
Zambia  1966  6.0  2.0  5.4  1.1  0.2  1.8  34.6  -23.7  18.9
Avengs  tor spike  8.8  2.7  1.5  4.2  0.0  2.5  311.9  236.2  43.0 epiodaf or  countrim
Average  for mm-spike (39)  1.4  45  11.2 counriis in sample
Compocaats  will  no sum to the %pike because  of the  covarbnce tam.50
money  demand  fell, but inflation  soared into 4 digits. Large inflation  accelerations  also took place
in Argentina  in 1975,  Mexico  in 1982,  and Zaire in 1987.
A decomposition  of the seignorage  spikes  into components  associated  with the real
change in the money  base and the inflation  tax helps  understand  the cases  in which  inflation  did
not accelerate." 1 Table 3.2 shows  that the real change in the money  base explains  most or all of
the above average  seignorage  in 7 out of the 16 cases. In 6 of these cases,  inflation  declined.
The failure of a close association  between  acceleration  of inflation  and bursts of seignorage  is
because  seignorage  was driven mainly  by real money  balances  in nearly  half of the cases. An
understanding  of this phenomenon  would  require  more careful examination  of the individual
cases,  but apparently  there was scope  for temporary  increases  in seignorage  revenues through
actions  like raising  reserve  requirements  or through  exploiting  exogenous  increases  in demand for
money. Price controls  were used in Chile in 1971  to generate the 'real' change in money
demand,  but inflation  exploded  the following  year.'
Of course, the classic  inflationary  method  worked as well  as a method to generate
bursts of seignorage. One-time  inflation  taxes  over 8 percentage  points  of GDP above average
were achieved  in the hyperinflations  in Bolivia  and Peru, while  less  spectacular  increases  were
registered  in Ghana, Argentina,  and Zaire. The money  base feil in all of these cases,  limiting  the
potential  for further inflation  taxes.
The growth  rates during the seignorage  spikes  were not such as to recommend  this
method of raising  revenue. In 12  out of the 16  episodes,  growth  during the episode  was below
the average  growth  rate for that country  - 8 cases  actually  registered  negative  output growth
(gross  not per capita)! We must be agnostic  about whether growth  was poor because  of the
4 1 Appellt  11  apain  how te  deomposition  is done
4 0 is  a  nOt  * genera  pattem however  - of the 9 cua whee seignorag  is  bplaine  largely  by  the change  in the real money
bone,  4 had  infltion  the following  year,  2 had ifation aaentially  unchanged,  and 3 had  failing  inflton the nat year.
Dombusch  et A*(19903  note the rime  in mal  monq balance  in the eary  staga of hypernflation.  Our story  is a different  one
appmsw  or  poItynduced  rim in rea money  blance  ow  lare temporary  egnorge  without  hyperinatlon.51
unusually  high  seignorage,  or whether countries  resorted to seignorage  because  economic
recession  dried up other revenue  sources. But it is interesting  that the countries  with 'spikes"
have a lower  average  growth  than other countries  in the sample,  which  may  reflect that they also
tend to have higher average  seignorage  and inflation.
In conclusion,  seignorage  may  be more important  as a source  of temporary  increases
in revenue than as a steady  state phenomenon. But the link between these temporary  seignorage
surges  and inflation  is weak. A surprising  number  of episodes  of high  seignorage  are due to
increases  in real money  balances  instead  of accelerated  inflation,  illustrating  the scope for
temporary  revenue increases  through  various  fiat actions  by the monetary  authorities  besides
printing  money. But the poor performance  of countries  that resort to such measures  is not
encouraging  to the case for bursts of seignorage  as a useful  instrument  of public  finance.
C.  Interest rates. financial  repression.  and fiscal  deficits:  evidence  from the case studies
There are two ways  in which  fiscal  deficits  can affect real interest rates. If interest
rates are not controlled,  then a high fiscal  deficit  financed  through  domestic  borrowing  would  be
expected  to result in high real interest rates. Alternatively,  interest rates could be controlled,  and
the implicit  tax on financial  assets  be a hidden  source of revenue  for the government.
Figure 3.3 shows  real interest rates in the case study  countries  in the 1980s. It is
apparent that controls  on interest rates were quite significant  in Ghana, Mexico,  and Zimbabwe.
since real interest rates were strongly  negative  in many  years. Table 2 in the Statistical  Appendix
presents this and other studies'  estimates  of "revenue"  from financial  repression  that resulted from
such controls. Although  estimates  differ  widely  because  of different  methodologies,  there is a
consistent  finding  that Ghana, Mexico,  and Zimbabwe  reaped significant  amounts  of revenue from
controls  on domestic  interest rates, particularly  in the aftermath  of the international  credit crunch52
Figure 3.3.
REAL INTEREST  RATES,  1978-88
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in 1982.0 The control of the nominal interest rate under high inflation was a quick way to
obtain 'revenue'  to replace the lost external financing after 1982.
However, the control of interest rates was a costly strategy for private credit and
investment.4' Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of domestic private credit in the case studies.
Mexico experienced a serious decline in the ratio of private credit to GDP from already low levels
in the aftermath of the financial repression.  Ghana's private credit ratio was at an abysmal level,
reflecting years of financial repression.  Zimbabwe is different from the other cases of financial
repression in that private credit kept rising through 1986. The case study argues that import and
capital controls were unusually effective both at increasing saving through suppressing demand
and at retaining assets in the country.
By contrast, countries that eschewed financial repression, like Chile and Thailand,
show a buoyant increase in private credit.  This may help to explain some of the superior
investment and growth performance in those two countries in the late 1980s.'
Argentina's massive decline in the ratio of private credit to GDP reflects a more
unusual kind of financial repression after 1985. The case study shows how the government, far
from controlling interest rates, oscillated between paying increasing real interest rates and
"melting down" domestic liabilities through .urprise devaluations and other methods (including a
forced conversion of time deposits into government bonds of questionable value in 1990). This
tactic was necessary because the high real interest rates themselves fueled the accumulation of
more debt, in a standard example of highly  unstable debt dynamics. Although the government
managed to keep fooling the public into buying domestic debt, increasingly  high real interest rates
'Esaimates  by oiowanwni  nd de Medo  (1990)  find  much  higher  rvenue fom financial  repression  for Morocco  and Zimbabwe
than do the other ource,  bemause  they  calculate  the tax rate  as the cm-post  differeace  between  domestic  and foreign  interest  ratea.
including  devuation  Morocco  and  Zimbabwe  both  were  eqpeiening  steady  real  devaluation  in the early  80's, tending  to raise  the
estimate  of the tax mte  using  this metho.
44Similr  conclusions  asr reached  by Clhamley  and Honohan  (1990).  Easr  (1989),  and Glonannini  and de Melo  (1990).
Dornbusch  and Reymosf  (989) argue  that finandal  mpresion  is costly  only  under  very  high  inflation.
Eate  (1991)  presents  evidence  from cross-section  rgrsions  that rmancial  represion  has  a negative  effect  on long-run54
Figure  3.4a  0
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were required to do so.  The Argentina  case study  gives  an entertaining  chronicle  of the rise in
nominal  interest rates at the outset of successive  economic  plans,  each of which  opened  with a
discrete  devaluation:
Nominal
Plan  Date  Devaluation  Interest rate (monthly)
Austral  June 1985  40%  7%
Primavera  August 1988  24%  10%
Bunge  Born I  July 1989  200%  17%
Bunge  Born II  December  1989  54%  60%
Erman Plan  January 1990  220%  100%
The case studies also  considered  the effect of deficits  on uncontrolled  interest rates
in econometric simulations.  The Chile case study  shows  that a doubling  of the deficit financed  by
domestic  debt (implying  a rise of 2% in the domestic  debt stock) increases  real interest rates by
only .1 percentage points. In Colombia,  an increase  in debt financing  of 1 percent of GDP raises
real interest rates by 3 to 5 percentage  points. An incresse  of govemment  domestic  debt in
Pakistan  of about 3 percent leads to a real interest rate increase  of about half a percentage point.
The doubling  of the domestic  real interest rate from 4 to 8 percent in the 1980's  in Pakistan  was
associated  with a rise from 9 to 21 percent in the ratio of public  domestic  debt to GDP.  In
Morocco,  a simulation  shows  a domestically  financed  increase  in the budget  deficit  of 2
percentage  points of GDP to increase  the real interest rate by only  .4 percentage points. In
Zimbabwe  (after decontrol  of interest rates), a 10% debt-financed  increase  in govemment
spending  is associated  with a increase  of only 1.5  pp in the real interest rate.  We conclude  that
the short-run  effect of government  fical expansion  on the uncontrolled  real interest rate is
generally  modest.*
"For  induuW  ouati,  Bairo and SWa4-Martmn  (1990) find that fisal vaabls  have  no significant  edlect on thc real WotMra
rate.56
XV. PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE TO PUBLIC  DEFICITS
How do private  consumers  in developing  countries  react to public  deficits  (or to
public  saving),  to taxes  and public  transfers,  or to interest rates boosted  by domestically-financed
deficits? In which  direction  and magnitude is private investment  (and hence growth)  affected  by
public  investment  programs,  corporate taxes,  and interest rates?
A. Private Consumption  and Fiscal  Policies
Fiscal  policies  affect private  consumption  through  various  channels:
1.  Private Disposable  Income:  a current tax hike affects  private consumption  through
disposable  income,  according  to the standard Keynesian  hypothesis  (KH). If it is transitory,  the
effect will be minimal,  according  to the permanent  income  hypothesis  (PIH), which  states that
only permanent  tax changes  affect  forward-looling  consumer  behavior. Both are wrong according
to the Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis  (REH), which  states that under certain restrictive
conditions  only government  spending  matters,  independently  whether it is financed  by taxes,  debt
or money.'
2.  Public  Saving  (or Deficit):  according  to the REH, permanent public  saving  affects
consumption  with the same coefficient  as permanent  private disposable  income  (net of taxes).
Permanent  public  saving  (ie. the permanent  public  deficit excluding  public  investment)  should be
the relevant  variable,  if public  investment  adds to productive  wealth. However,  current public
saving  (which  sometimes  is used as a proxy  for permanent  saving)  could have  strong positive
effects  on consumption  for a reason unrelated  to the REH: under domestic  financial  repression
with compulsory  credit flows  financing  government  deficits,  credit to the private  sector and hence
private consumption  (and investment),  are the residual  variables. This effect, which  will  be hard
to distinguish  from the REHP  will  be termed the 'direct crowding-out  hypothesis"  (DCH).
e 7fl, ongiiAI  sutemeut  is due to Barro  (1974). Surmy  of empiril  evidence  (mosu*  neptiv) can  be found  in Bembdm  (1967)
nd Haquc nd Moolci  (1967).57
3.  Public Consumption: abstracting from the REH, aggregate public consumption, and
in particular public spending on certain categories such as education, health and in-kind transfers,
could crowd out or in private consumption expenditure, depending on the substitutability or
complementarity of the corresponding public spending category with private consumption.
4.  Rates of Return: the real interest rate determines intertemporal consumption
allocation when consumers are not liquidity constrained, although its effect on current
consumption :evels is theoretically ambiguous due to the offsetting substitution, income, and
wealth effects.  Even when it is unambiguous, the effect of the real interest rate on consumption
is low or zero when borrowing constraints are pervasive. The effect of inflation, the (negative)
return on monetary asset holdings, on the level of saving and consumption is also theoretically
ambiguous.
Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of the above mentioned fiscal policy-related
variables.  Most of the case studies identify both current (or transitory) and long-run (or
permanent) disposable income levels as important determinants of private consumption, by
magnitudes which are often half-way  between the extreme KH and PIH.
Does public saving or the deficit affect private consumption directly and separately?
In most countries it does not: permanent public saving is not significant in Chile, Mexico, and
Pakistan; current public saving or deficits do not contribute to consumption in Colombia, Cote
d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Pakistan.  In three cases, however, public saving or the deficit have the
expected signs and significance levels, consistent with either the REH or DCH.  In Argentina and
Morocco permanent public surpluses, and in Zimbabwe permanent public saving, raise
consumption.  However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are much lower than those of long-run
or permanent income, implying that taxes, not only government spending, affect consumption.
Are these three coefficients a result of at least partially forward-looking  consumers treating the
public sector's budget constraint as part of their own, as postulated by the REH?  Or do they58
TABL.E  4.1
SE,NSITIVITY  OF  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  TO FISCAL  POLICiES
(iOuaIiIaSjvc  ad  Ouaatialivc Respons  c ocmficicmasl
Coital  Income  luil1ic Savior  Puiblic  D4cGit  Public  Icalnier,csi ltlaSion
Curwrx  Pennanent  Cusrr  cnI  fcng  Currcnl  1rmans  Consumrion  IE  Ulftj  B!E  Rate
1.  Arcensina.  (1)  (-)
1915-84.  1961-84
2.  Cbik,  (t)  (i)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)
1960-t8  0.55  0.37
3.  Colombia,  (t)  (t)  (0)  (1)
;971-86
4.  Coc d'lvoirc,  ( +  . (0)
1972-1981
S.  Ghna,  ((0)  (0)
1969no0-l988  0.671  0.32'
6.  Mexico,  (+)  (0)  (0)  (  (0)
1981.I-1989>.IV
7.  Morocco.  (  (0)  0
0.882  0.25"  -0.23"
3.  Pksslauaka(0)  (0)  (  (
1963-87  1.35S  -0.561
9.  Thailand,  ()
1971-87  0.794  0.10"  -0.23%
10.  Zimbabwe,  (t)  O)()  (0)  (0)




(i)  Symbols  (+),  (-) and (0) denote signs of the coefficients  of private consumption  determinants from the
correponding econometric estimation.  The positive and negative signs correspond to statistically  significant
coefficients,  (0) denotes a coeMcient not significantly  different from zero, and a blank space denotes the ecxdusion  of
the corresponding variable from the  country study.
(ii)  EHITR denotes public expenditure on privately  appropriated services (education and health) and/or transfers to the
private sector.
(ili)  Specifications  and estimation techniques vary by countries. The dependent variable (private consumption) enters in
leves for Argentina, Ghana, and Pakistan, log levels  for Morocco and Thailand, both levels  and log levels for
Coiombia,  ratio to national income for Cote d'lvoire, and ratio to private disposable income for Chile, Mexico,  and
Zimbabwe.
(iv)  The numerical coefficients  without a note are partial derivatives  of private consumption rates (to either private
diposable  or national income) with respect to the rate of the correponding variable (to either private disposable or
national Income), unles noted otherwise. When noted othetwise, coeffidents are  1) marginal  propensities;  )
elasticities; 3) semi-elasticitieL
(v)  The specificatio  for Morocco, Colombia,  and Pakistan (the two latter based on error-correction models) allow  to
distinguish between short and long-run  coeffidents; the latter are presented for Morocco and Pakistan in the table.
result firom  direct-crowding  out due to financial  repression? Argentina 4 liberalized  its domestic
financial  markets  in 1977  (late in the relevant  sample  period),  while  Morocco  and Zimbabwe  had
non-liberalized  financial  markets  with institutional  arrangements  allowing  the public  sector
preferential  access  to resources  of the domestic  financial  system. Hence we conclude  tentatively
that DCH dominates  REH in those cases. 4'
The real interest rate is not a significant  consumption  determinant  in 5 of the 8
countries  which  included  it as a right-hand  variable. Three countries  show  significant  effects  of
the real interest rate: in Mexico  it depresses  private  consumption  (which  signals  the dominance  of
4§  In the cae  of Argentina,  public  xpenditure  and revenue, not the defict, were entered spartely  as  consumption  determinants,
However,  their coefficients  were so similar  in manitude  - with opposite sigs  - and sgniSicance  kves,  that the public deflit  is a
valid summay  variable for them.  Hover,  the relevant income variable was caoen to be GNP, not private dispoble  income net of
tae  Hence the introduction  of the deficit (or of revenue and  xpenditure septely)  does not cancel tame induded in disposable
income, and therefore this specification is not directly consistent with the REH.
4 The  rewlts for Cile,  Zimbabwe,  Ghana, and Morcoo  are consistent with those of a recent 13-developing  countuy study (which
includes them with eception  of Morocco), which  estimates the following anges for the coefficients of current income,  estimated
permanent income, and estimated permanent public saving,  respectively 0.494079,  0.20-28,  and  0.42-0.56  (Corbo and Schmidt-
HebbeL 1991, table 3.1).60
the substitution  effect)  while in two countries  (Colombia  and Thailand)  a higher real interest rate
raises  consumption,  i.e., reduces  private  saving. The non-significant  results  suggest  that either the
liquidity,  income,  and wealth  effects tend to cancel each other and/or borrowing  constraints
preclude  consumers  from responding  to interest rate swings  by shifting  consumption  across  time
according  to their preferences.
Inflation  has an unexpected  effect in our sample. While  inflation  has no discernible
influence  on private  consumption  in three countries,  it has a significantly  negative  effect in three
other countries  (Morocco,  Pakistan,  and Thailand),  which  are among  the low-inflation  countries
of our sample. Seigniorage  (and hence inflation  tax) and inflation  are correlated  in two of these
three low-inflation  countries,' and hence higher  inflation  causes  a drop in real income  not
reflected  in conventional  disposable  income. Alternatively,  higher inflation  is correlated  with
greater macroeconomic  instability,  inducing  higher precautionary  saving.
B.  Private Investment  and Fiscal  Policies
Fiscal  policies  affect private investment  through  various  channels:
1.  Public  Capital:  in Appendix  III we present a model  in which  the relationship  between
private investment  and public  capital is theoretically  ambiguous. Public capital  could be a near-
perfect substitute  for private  capital and drive down  the private rate of return. Public  capital
invested  in steel plants is an obvious  example. However,  governments  also invest  in activities
where the private sector would  not invest,  like infrastructure,  for which  it is difficult  to charge
user fees. The net effect on private investment  will  be stronger the lower the substitutability  of
private capital  for public  infrastructure.
2.  Public Deficit:  as in the case of consumption,  domestic  financial  repression  with
preferential  access  of the public  sector to domestic  resources  in order to finance its deficit implies
to  Morocw and Thailand,  the inflation rate  is poitive and signiricant  at a 10% lvel in an  equation ror  seignloage.  In Pakistan
it i  not anifintly  diffaent  frm  zeo61
that the latter could crowd  out directly  private  investment. If this is in particular  the case of
public  sector investment  projects,  it leads  to the direct crowding  out of private investment  by
public  investment  flows.
3.  Corporate Taxes  and Investment  Incentives:  the profit tax and investment  incentive
structure affects  after-tax  profits  and the user cost of capitaL In the country  studies,  corporate tax
revenue is entered either as a separate  investment  determinant  or as a tax rate affecting  the user
cost of capital. Other tax incentives  to investment  also modify  the user cost of capital.
4.  Real Interest Rite: without  financial  repression,  domestic  deficit  financing  tends to
raise the real interest rate and hence lower  investment  profitability.
Table 4.2 summarizes  the effects  of the above mentioned  fiscal  policy-related
variablesl  leaving  the discussion  of the role of non policy-related  variables  to the original  case
studies. Consistent  with the theoretical  ambiguity  of the relationship  between public  capital  and
private investment,  the case  studies found sharply  different  results. The Pakistan  study found that
the ratio of private capital  stock  to output rises  by 2.1 pp with a 1 pp increase  in the public
capital  stock/output  ratio. In Zimbabwe,  a higher public  capital  stock  raises  private investment
flows;  however,  the effect is smaller  than in Pakistan. The Chile and Colombia  studies  found the
opposite  in some regressions,  indicating  substitution  between public  and private capital  in
production.
Some  studies  used public  investment  rather than the public  capital  stock as a
determinant  of private investment  -- again the results show  opposite  signs  in different  countries.
The Ghana and Mexico  studies  found a negative  effect of public  on private  investment  (although
the Mexico  effect was only  weakly  significant),  while  the Thailand  study found a positive  effect  of
public  on private investment. For Argentina,  no significant  effect  was found. Finallv.  theTABLE 4.2
SENSITIVITY  OF PRIVATE  INVESTMENT  TO  FISCAI.  POLICIES
(Qualitalive  and  Quantilative  Rcsponse  Coefficients)
Cimiurv  PtlPublic  Capital  P-iblic  CoIgrale Tax  Cost  of Capital
StoCk  Flow  Dlficjj  Consumptim  Revenm  Reveal  User  Cot  Real  Ina.  Rate
1.  Argentina,  (0)  (-)  (0)
1915-U4
2.  Chile,  (0)(°)  ()I(-)
1961-1988
3.  Colombia,  (-)  (O)(-)
1925-88
4.  Cole  d'lvoire,  (-)
1972-87  . -0.10
5.  Ghana,  (  (  (0)
1967-88  -1.10  3.97
6.  Mexico,  (0)I(-)  (O)  (O)
1970-89  0-0.12  -0.401-0.86  -0.05
7.  Morocco.  (t)  (-)
8.  Pakistan,  (O)
1972/73-1981/88  2.09"'  -1.26w
9.  Thailand,  (M)  (O)
1971-87  0.57"  -1.15"
10. Zimbabwe,  (t)  (-)




(i)  Symbols  (+)  (-) and (0) denote signs of the coefficients  of private consumption determinants from the
conrsponding  econometric estimations. The positive and neptive  signs oorrespond to statistically  significant
coefficients,  (0) denotes a coefficient  not significantly  diffrent  from zero, and a blank space denotes the exclusion  of
the corresponding varable from the country study.
(U)  Specifications  and eatimation techniques vary by countries.  Tbe dependent variable is private investment for all
countries (leu Cote d'lvoire and Pakistan); it enters in levels for Argentina, log levels for Thailand,  ratio to GDP for
Chile, Ghana, Madco and Zimbabwe, log ratio to GDP for Morocco,  and either level,  log level or ratio to GDP for
Colombia.  In the case of Pakistan, the dependent variable is the private capital stock to GDP ratio.  Due to data
limitations,  the dependent variable is the domestic investment  to national income ratio in the case of Cote d'lvoire.
(Ili)  The numerical coefficients  without a note are partial derivatives  of private investment rates (to GDP) with respect to
the rate of the correponding variable unless noted otherwse.  When noted btherwise.  coefficients  are:  1)
elasticities. In the  aes  of Pakistan, the coefients  are: 2) partial derivatives  of the private capital  stock/output ratio
with respect to the private capital  stockloutput ratio and the user cost of capital,  respectively.
(iv)  The  specifications for Morocco,  Colombia,  and Pakistan (the two latter based on error-correction models) allow to
distinguish  between short and long-run  coefficients; the latter are presented for Morocco and Pakistan in the table.
(v)  Ihe  specifiation for Morocco indudes an output and a private investment  equation, the latter depending on output
growth. Output was found to be positively  (margiially significant)  affected by public investment. Hence we infer
that reduced-form private invetment depends positively  on public investment,  as shown in the table.
Morocco  study found that public  investment  contributes  to growth,  and because  the latter raises
private investment,  we may  infer that public  investment  increases  private  capital  formation."
If these results  are taken literally,  we find direct  evidence  for the beneficial  effect of
public  sector capital  on private investment  only in three of the studies,  which  is surprising  in view
of the widespread  assumption  that public  investment  raises  the private  rate of return to capital
and thus private investment. A plausible  explanation  in those countries  that find a negative
(Chile,  Colombia,  Ghana, and Mexico)  or zero (Argentina)  relationship  is that public  investment
is concentrated  in activities  that substitute  directly  for private  initiative  and/or that financing  of
public  investment  takes directly  resources  which  would  have been available  for private investment.
Only a few  studies entered public  deficits  (or their main components)  as separate
private  investment  determinants. In the two cases  where  deficits  are entered directly,  they play  a
518y  way  of compariso  Aschauer  (1989) finds public capital to poitivety influence  private investment in the U.S., and Bartoli
(1969) find  a simiar rolt  for a smple of Latin American  countries.64  I
negative  role, which  is weak in Cote d'Ivoire and strong in Thailand. In the Argentina  study,  the
three main  components  of deficits  instead  of the deficit per se are entered. As already
mentioned,  public  investment  did not affect  private capital  formation  in Argentina;  however,
public  consumption  and public  revenue play  significant  roles,  wi.h signs  consistent  with the
crowding-out  hypothesis. From our partial evidence  we may  conclude  that deficits  tend to crowd
out private investment,  particularly  when the public  sector has no easy access  to foreign  financing,
but has preferential  access  to domestic  resources  through repressed  domestic  financial  markets.
Corporate taxes  have a strong  negative  effect on private investment  in Mexico
(where  they enter separately)  and in Morocco  (where the corporate tax rate is part of the user
cost of capital). In Morocco  investment  incentives  also play  a strong positive  role, as reflected  by
the user cost of capital. 52 In Ghana, however,  corporate taxes  play  an unexpected  significant
and positive  role in private  investment  -- presumably  due to the exclusion  of corporate profits  as a
result of data unavailability.
Fmally,  the real interest rate enters private  investment  equations  in seven case
studies. The results,  as compared  to other studies  which  show  frequently  that private investment
is interest-insensitive,  are surprisingly  strong: the effect  of the cost of capital is significant  and
negative  in S cases.5'  The corresponding  coefficients  range from low (Chile  and Mexico)  to
moderate  (Zimbabwe)  and to high (Morocco  and Pakistan). Only two  cases (Colombia  and
Ghana) found private investment  tc be interest-insensitive,  and in the former  an interest effect
was found in some  regressions.
2  Ihe Morcco study  is  the  only  one  wbicb  iders the corporate  tax  rate and  invtment  incentives,  differentiated  bv reions
md capital  categoda, in the calulation  of the user  cost  of capitalsl
-"See  R  (1990) and Sene  and Solmano (1991).65
V. FISCAL  DEFICFrS,  TRADE  DEFICITS,  AND  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATES
The project case  studies found  surprisingly  robust  relationships  between the fiscal
deficit,  the trade deficit,  and the real exchange  rate, of the type proposed  by Rodriguez  (1989).
He suggested  a two-step  relationship  between  the fscal deficit  and the real exchange  rate: the
fiscal  deficit and other determinants  of investment  and saving  behavior  determine  the external
deficit,  which  then determines  the real exchange  rate consistent  with clearing  of the domestic
goods market.
Figure 5.1 presents  the evolution  of real exchange  rates in the 10 project  countries  in
the 1980s. Real exchange  rates are ciosely,  correlated  with the behavior  of fiscal  deficits  in many
episodes. The major fiscal  adjustment  in dote d'lvoire in 1982-85  was accompanied  by real
depreciation;  subsequent  fiscal  backsliding  in 1985-88  occurred  together with real appreciation.
The large fiscal  deficit  reduction  in Colombia  over 1983-88  was accompanied  by real depreciation.
Similarly,  Chile's  real depreciation  of 1984-88  was  contemporaneous  with a fall in the deficit.
Ghana's reform  program  after 1982  included  both a deficit  reduction  and a real depreciation  of
the official  exchange  rate (as well  as a depreciation  of the real black market exchange  rate).
Morocco  experienced  both a deficit reduction  and a real depreciation  over 1982-85;  Thailand  had
both occurring  together over 1985-88.  These episodes  demonstrate  that fiscal  adjustment  and real
depreciation  are closely  associated,  because  real exchange  rates reflect fundamentals  such as
excess  demand arising  from deficits,  and in some  of these cases  because  nominal  devaluations  and
fiscal  adjustment  occurred  together in adjustment  packages.'
Six of the case studies  tested directly  the relationship  between fscal and external
deficits  (the others used comprehensive  macroeconomic  frameworks  that related  the variables
indirectly). All of the six found evidence  that fiscal  deficits  were associated  with external deficits,
5%dwurd  (1969) fnd  that nominal dealuation  affected the rea  Schnge  ate signifiantly in the first year,  and that the rea
meange  rate adjued  lowly to its equilibrium  value, altbough nomia  dealuation was neutral in the long run (p. 141).  Howese,
nona  devluations  gt  as real  devaluations  if accompaied  by fil  adjusnt.66
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although  in two of the cases  the evidence  was  qualified.55  These same  six studies  found that the
trade surplus  was a significant  determinant  of the real exchange  rate, with the expected  sign that
higher surpluses  lead to greater real depreciation. Thus, in the complete  system,  a lower  fiscal
deficit  leads to real depreciation.
The other four case  studies  also found evidence  that the fiscal  deficit  significantly
affects  the real exchange  rate.' 6 In Thailand  and Morocco,  the estimated  model  equations
indicate  an appreciation  of the real exchange  rate when fiscal  deficits  increase. In Ghana, a
modified  approach  to take into account  a black market  in foreign  exchange  found that higher
fiscal  deficits  both appreciate  the official  exchange  rate and raise the black market premium. The
only  cortrary result was in the Pakistan  study,  where  a deficit  reduction  due to a cut in public
investment  would  appreciate  the real exchange  rate in general  equilibrium  because  of the negative
supply  effect of reducing  public  investment.
The studies  also examined  the Rodriguez  (1989)  hypothesis  that increases  in public
spending,  for a given  deficit,  would  affect  the real exchange  rate because  of differences  between
the public  and private sector propensity  to spend on nontradables  vis-a-vis  tradables. The results
from the six case  studies that tested this directly  are split. In C6te d'Ivoire,  Argentina,  and
Zimbabwe,  higher government  spending  leads to real appreciation,  indicating  the government  is
more prone to consume  nontradables  than the private  sector. In Colombia,  Chile,  and Mexico,  it
is the reverse,  suggesting  that those governments  consume  tradables  more heavily  than the private
sector.
The studies also generaily  found that terms of trade improvements  lead to real
appreciation  of the currency. Six  of the seven  studies  that tested this relationship  found this
effect to be significant,  although  the seventh  study,  Thailand,  found the counter-intuitive  result
"En  Chie,  only  the umple  omreation  wa signiricant;  the  sipificance  disappeared  when  other  determinants  of the trade defiit
were  added  In C&te  d'vmire,  the relationship  ws significant  only  in the 1979489  period  n
Un generaL  canity  may  not  be unidirectioaal:  Section  11  of this paper  and Fieo  and Reieo (1990)  show  how  the resa
change  rate may  affect  us reenue68
that terms-of-trade  improvements  depreciate  the real exchange  rate.  The Ghana study  found that
terms of trade improvements  tend to lower  the black market premium.
Thus, all of the studies  give  support to the notion that the real exchange  rate is
sensitive  to both policy  and external  variables,  with the fiscal  deficit  prominent  among  them. This
contrasts  with the result mentioned  earlier that there is little cross-section  association  between
deficits  and real overvaluation.  A plausible  explanation  is that differences  in trade intervention
are largely  responsible  for cross-national  differences  in overvaluation,  while in any given  country
macro  policies  such as fiscal  deficits  explain  real exchange  rate movements  over time. For
example,  the Colombia  study found that most of the real depreciation  associated  with the
adjustment  program  of 1985-89  was due to the reduction  of the deficit.
VI. POLICY  CONCLUSIONS
To conclude,  we summarize  the main policy  implications  of the 10 case  studies  and
the analysis  of this paper.
Fiscal  Adjustment. Three case studies  of the project (Chile,  Mexico,  Thailand)  show
strong  and fast fiscal  adjustment,  four follow  a,more gradualist  approach  to rscal stabilization
(Colombia,  Ghana, Morocco,  Zimbabwe),  and three correspond  to moderate  (Pakistan)  or
massive  (Argentina,  Cote d'Ivoire) fiscal  deterioration. The first two  groups  encompass  countries
which  have achieved  in the late 1980s  sustainable  deficit levels,  defined as those compatible  with
stable public  debt to income ratios. By contrast,  the latter three countries  have raised their
deficits  levels  increasingly  beyond  sustainable  levels  during the 1980s. Both foreign  and domestic
macroeconomic  shocks  play  a minor  role in the cyclical  variation  and structural  changes  of non-
financial  public  sector deficits. Active  fiscal  policies,  under the direct control  of policymakers,  are
both the main culprit of fiscal  crises  and an effective  instrumient  in bringing  about fiscal
stabilization  and adjustment.69
The experiences  show  that successful  non-financial  public  sector adjustment  requires
acting  on four fronts: reducing  an overblown  government  bureaucracy,  cutting  transfers  and
subsidies  (other than efficient  social  programs),  adopting  tax systems  conducive  to broadly-based
direct and indirect  taxation,  and reforming  or privatizing  public  enterprises  and commodity
marketing  boards. Efficient  public  investment,  particularly  in social  or physical  infrastructure,
should  not only  be exempted  from  fiscal  cuts but possibly  expanded  to encourage  economic
growth.
Quasi-fiscal  losses  -- the deficits  of the public  financial  sector, particularly  the central
bank -- are a result of emergency  loans to the financial  system  or exchange  rate subsidies,  granted
in periods of financial  distress  and external  crises  and in countries  where the central  bank is
subordinated  to the ministry  of finance. A sound regulatory  framework  for the commercial
banking  sector and a more independent  central bank are necessary  features -- although  no
guarantees  - for preventing  recurrent quasi-fiscal  deficits.
Fiscal  deficits  and inflation. A conventional  inflation  tax "Laffet  curve"  is well
supported by cross-sectional  empirical  evidence. Conventional  time-series  estimates  of revenue-
maximizing  inflation  rates appear to be biased (upward  in high inflation  countries,  downward  in
low  inflation  ones) by misspecification  of money  demand  as being of constant semi-elasticity  with
respect to inflation,  when in fact the semi-elasticity  falls  as inflation  rises.
Thus, to the extent that deficits  are financed  by money  creation,  the relationship
between fiscal  deficits  and inflation  is indisputable. HIwever, the "fiscal  approach  to inflation'
exaggerates  the link  Seignorage  is so trivial  as a source of fiscal  revenue,  and the tradeoffs
between additional  inflation  and amounts  of fiscal  financing  so unfavorable,  that it is hard to
believe  that revenue motivations  alone explain  cases  of chronic high inflation  like Argentina."
57SiUr  ccmdua  e  AMhKd  in Tbe  wor  of  upel  and  Utan  (1989).70
Seignorage  is more important  as a source  of temporary  surges in revenue,  but even there the link
to inflation  is weakL
Fiscal  deficits  and financial  repression. There is an association  between financial
repression  and fiscal  crises  -- high fiscal  deficits  are correlated  with highly  negative  real interest
rates, and the disappearance  of external financing  of fiscal  deficits  seems to lead to high taxes on
financial  intermediation. But the poor performance  of countries  -- in terms  of depressed private
credit, investment,  and growth  -- that engage in strong financial  repression  hardly  recommends
this solution  to fiscal  crises. It is true that financial  liberalization  will  worsen  the public  debt
burden. However,  adjustment  of conventional  taxes to lower  deficits  would  be far preferable  to
implicit  taxes  on financial  assets - since both are taxes,  there is no reason to expect  conventional
fiscal  adjustment  to be any more contractionary  than adjustment  through  financial  repression."
Budget  Structure.  Deficits.  and Private  Consumption.  Taxes have an unambiguously
negative  effect on private consumption  through  disposable  income. While a temporary  tax hike
does not have the massive  effect predicted  by the simple  Keynesian  hypothesis,  nor does it have
the minimal  size attributed  to it by the permanent-income  hypothesis." If the tax increase  is
maintained  over time,  the response  of consumption  will  grow  stronger. According  to the
Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis,  higher (permanent)  public  saving  should lead to an offsetting
reduction in private  saving. Alternatively,  if domestic  financial  markets  are controlled  and if the
public  sector has preferential  access  to their resources,  a higher (current)  deficit will  directly
crowd  out private expenditure  in general and consumption  in particular. However,  most studies
showed  that public  saving  (or public  deficits)  had no significant  effects on private consumption.
The policy implication is that increasing public saving - reducing public deficits -- is the most
"Dombusch  et aL  (1990)  make  a similar  arpment  with  rapect  to inflation  tam.
5 "A similar ondetiuoL reached  for the U.S.  by  Potefba  (1968).71
effective contribution fiscal policy can make to raise national saving.'  The way the deficit is
financed -- and  hence  the changes  in domestic  real  interest  and  inflation  rates  -- can  have some
effect on private consumption.  While the role of real interest rates is either ambiguous or
negligible, inflation tends to reduce consumption in low-inflation  countries.
Budget Structure. Deficits. and Private Investment.  A wide range of responses of
private investment to the public capital stock (or to public investment) is observed in developing
countries.  A negative influence of public capital on private investment is frequently present in
countries with a large public enterprise sector which competes with private firms and where the
public sector has preferential access to domestic financial resources.  Aggregate public deficits --
not only public investment -- tend to crowd out private investment (and consumption) in the
latter countries.  The implication is that privatization or reform of public firms and marketing
boards, a concentration of public investment on public and social infrastructure, and deregulation
of domestic financial markets (encompassing the elimination of credit ceilings, compulsory credit
allocation, preferential access of the government to credit, and interest coitrols)  are the three
elements which would reenforce private/public sector complementarity and hence increase the
prospects for higher private investment and growth.
Fiscal deficits. trade deficits, and real exchange rates.  A simple model relating real
exchange rates to trade deficits to fiscal deficits explains a great deal of real exchange rate
variation.  Real exchange rates really do seem to be driven by "fundamentals",  which should serve
as an antidote to the mistaken notion of many policymakers  that nominal devaluation by itself can
restore macroeconomic balance although it is useful in combination with fiscal adjustment.'
Real exchange rates also seem to be affected considerably by whether government spending is
oriented more towards tradables or nontradables -- our studies show no strong presumption either
lhis condusion is shared by recent  cro-country  saving studies for developing  countrie  Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) and
Schdidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Conetti (1991).
6%dwards  (1969) concludes that real echange rates can reach their  fundamentale-determined level morm  quickly by combining
6-  adjustment with nomunal  dvluation.72
way.'  This suggests  that policymakers  pay attention to the composition  of government  spending
when deciding  on an accommodating  exchange  rate policy.
Fiscal  deficits  and growth. This research project did not directly  address  the effect  of
fscal deficits  on growth. But there are some  suggestive  findings  pointing  toward further research.
Low per capita growth  is associated  with both a high level and a high variance  of the riscal
deficit." The conventional  notion that public  investment  is good for private investment  and
growth  receives  little support in the econometric  work  for the case  studies,  so there is little basis
on which  to justify  high deficits  "because  they are due to investment".  Countries  that were forced
to shift from external to intemal financing  of deficits  - often because  of debt crises  induced  bv
previous  fiscal  mismanagement  -- had particularly  poor growth  performance  in the 80's. Low  and
stable fiscal  deficits  seem to be a good idea for the long-run  prospects  of a country  as well  as for
the shor-run imbalances  reflected  in inflation,  interest rates, and real exchange  rates. And
growth  itself  makes deficits  less  harmful:  countries  like  Pakistan  and Thailand  could sustain  larger
deficits  because  of high growth,  while  economic  collapse  worsened  the macro  effects  of deficits  in
Argentina,  Cote d'Ivoire, and Mexico.
62See  the modd of Khan  and Lizondo  (1967) for a similar  theoretical rsult.
. OW"hile  this audy  jumt  boked at aimple  illudtive  corrlations Fscher (1991) found an effect of the level of the deficit on Vrbh
in cm-4ction  multhte  r  _egioaL73
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APPENDIX 1:
SEIGNORAGE-MAXMIZING INFLATION RATES
AND MISSPECIFICATION OF MONEY DEMAND
An empirical  regularity  noted in the text is that the estimated  seignorage-maximizing
inflation  rate rises  with Lhe  inflation  rate that is actually  observed. In high inflation  countries,  the
seignorage  maximizing  rate is high,  while  it is low  in low  inflation  countries. For example,  the
estimated  seignorage  maximizing  rate in Thailand  is only  4% per annum,  while  in Argentina  it is
21.8%  per month,
This suggests  a systematic  misspecification  of money  demand. In a constant  semi-
elasticity  money  demand function  a la Cagan  (1956),  the seignorage-maximizing  rate is  just the
reciprocal  of the semi-elasticity  of money  demand  with respect to inflation. Thus, it appears  that
high inflation  countries  systematically  have lower  semi-elasticities,  which  contradicts  the
assumption  of constancy  of this parameter. This is intuitively  plausible  -- as inflation  gets high,
households  substitute  into other assets that play  some  of the roles of money. At very high rates
of inflation,  all the good substitutes  for money  have  already  been found. Further increases  in
inflation  would  not have much  effect,  since money  demand  is already  at rock bottom. This
intuition is confirmed  by a simple  model  of money  demand,  inflation  and seignorage.
A model  of seignorage.  money  demand,  and growth




where  p is the discount  rate, c is consumption,  and 1/a  is the intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution.
Production  (y) in the one-good  economy  is assumed  to depend  only on a broad
concept  of capital  (k), as in Rebelo (1991)  and Barro (1990). Population  is assumed  fLxed  and
normalized  at one, so all variables  can be interpreted  in per capita terms.
(2)  y  - A  k
There are three assets available  to the consumer  -- capital  k, nonindexed  money  (real
value m), and indexed  money  (real value b, referred to as "bonds*  for short). Bonds pay no
interest but are fully  indexed  to the price level. This type of asset is observed  in many  Latin
American  countries  that have highly  liquid  deposits  indexed  by consumer  prices (for example,  the
UPAC deposits  in the Cajas  de Ahorro  y Vivienda  in Colombia). Since  capital  has real return A
and there is no uncertainty,  capital always  dominates  bonds, and capital  dominates  money  at
expected inflation  rates above -A. However,  there is assumed  to be a cash-in-advance  constraint,
.L78
which  is that some combination  of money  and bonds  must be held in order to purchase
consumption  goods:
(3)  f(m,b)  - c  k O
Here f is linearly  homogeneous  in m and b, and satisfies  f,>O, fb >  0, f=<O, f,b<O.  In other
words,  either money  or bonds  can be used for transactions.' In general,  they will  be imperfect
substitutes  so that both will  be used. This approach  is in the same  spirit as the Lucas  and Stokey
(1987)  generalization  of cash-in-advance  models  lo include 'cash"  and "credit"  goods. The
intuitive  justification  is also similar  to the "shopping  costs"  approach  of Arrau and de Gregorio
(1991).
The consumer  will face the following  budget  constraint  each period:
(4)  c  - y  - M - B  - I
where M, B, and I are the real flows  of resources  devoted to accumulation  of money,  bonds, and
capital,  respectively.  The accumulation  of the 3 assets will  be given  by:
(5)  di  M - ICm
(6)  6  B
(7)  k-
The A parameter is defned net of depreciation  so I is net investment.  Xr is the inflation  rate.
The consumer-producer  solves  the intertemporal  problem  (1)-(7) with perfect
foresight. The first order conditions  imply  the following  standard expression  for the c-owth g of
consumption  (and output):
(8)  g  - (  p) /
Note that.growth  is not affected  by the rate of inflation,  which  is a standard result when the cash-
in-advance  constraint applies  only to consumption  goods.
The first order condition  for the allocation  of wealth  between m and b will  be the
following:
"A simiar cub-in-adae  constraint  appear, in Wabh (1984).79
(9)  f1 fb  a  (A  +
Consumers  will  substitute  bonds  for money  in transactions  as inflation  rises.
The determination  of the ratio of money  to consumption  will  be given  by (3), which  can be
rewritten  as:
(10)  f  (m/c,  bc)  - 1
One convenient  function  to discuss  the sensitivity  of money  demand  to inflation  in
this formulation  is the CES function:
(11)  A(m,b)  - [4yml + (1-y)bx]'/
where bonds atnd  money  have  elasticity  of substitution  1/(n-1)  in transactions.
From (9), the ratio of bonds to money  with this function  will be:
(12)  !uXA
From (10), the ratio of money  to consumption  wilH  be given  by:
(13)  m =  (y  + (1 -y)  o)
c  A
From (12) and (13), it can be seen that money  demand is unambiguously  a negative
function  of inflation. From (13), the semi-elasticity  of money  demand  with respect  to inflation
wili  be:
(14)  . - 1!)  (1-y)Qs) ( -")  (J
ft  y + (1  -y),*t,  I-n  ,X
It can be shown  that the absolute  value of the semi-elasticity  falls  with inflation  as inflation  gets
arbitrarily  large.'  This reflects the substitution  out of money  into bonds as inflation  rises. As
51f n c  0 (eascity  of substitution  lem  than one), thne we  can see  from (14)  that the absolute  value  of semlelsticity  falls
uaambiuouay. If a > 0 (but c 1, as  required)  then the absoiute  value  of uanieetelty nay  a  initially  as  inflauon  rise  but  will
ventually  fall - ination goes  to infinity.  A sufficent  codition for the absolute  value  of the emlelatidly to faU  monotonically  is n
< 12 (eldaity  of substitution  le  than 2).80
this substitution  proceeds,  the marginal  value of bonds in transactions  falls  so that the response  to
further changes  in inflation  is low  when inflation  is already  high.
It is of interest to see how  this affects  the calculation  of the seignorage  maximizing
rate. Seignorage  will  be given  by money  growth,  which  is equal in steady  state to the inflation
rate plus the growth  rate, times  existing  holdings  o'  noney  (defined  as a ratio to consumption):
(1J)  S = (X +  g)  rm/c
The government  is assumed  to determine  money  growth  exogenously  and to waste the proceeds s
(or equivalently  transfer them back to consumers  in lump  sum form).
An interior maximum  for seignorage  will  exist  if money  demand falls  off more quickly
than inflation  rises at some level of inflation. It can be shown  this requires  that the elasticity  of
substitution  between  bonds and money  be greater than one in absolute  value. If this elasticity  is
less than or equal to one, then seignorage  will always  increase  with inflation  until consumption  is
driven to zero. Intuitively,  money  is essential  to transactions  if the elasticity  is less than one, so
seignorage  behaves  as it would  in the cash-in-advance  model  with only money.
The seignorage  maximizing  rate does not have a closed  form solution. However,  the
model  can be simulated  with notional  parameters  to see how the optimal  inflation  rate responds
to the substitutability  of money. Table 1 shows  the simulated  values  of optimal  inflation  for
various  elasticities. The optimal  inflation  rate becomes  astronomical  as the elasticity  approaches
unity,  while  it is modest  when substitutability  is high.
Simulation  of model  with different  elasticities
c  1  Jr max
n-i
.2  -1.25  12,600%
.225  -1.29  5,200%
.25  -1.33  1,750%
.275  -1.38  760%
.3  -1.43  400%
.35  -1.54  160%
.4  -1.67  80%
.5  -2.0  40%
The cross-section  results presented  in Section  2 of the text suggest  an inflation-
maximizing  rate between 68 and 160%  across  countries,  consistent  with moderately  high
substitutability  between bonds and money. This would  suggest  that th_ optimal inflation  rate was
overestimated  in the high inflation  countries  (e.g. Argentina)  and underestimated  in the low
inflation  countries  (e.g. lthailand).81
If the true money  demand  function  is such that the semi-elasticity  of money  demand
falls  with inflation,  then the use of a Cagan  constant  semi-elasticity  function  will lead one to
overestimate  optimal  inflation  in high inflation  countries,  and underestimate  it in low-inflation
countries. To see this, consider  a generic  money  demand  function:
(16)  Im m  = g(:)  where  g1cO  and  g"'>O
The only restrictions  on money  demand  are that it is a negative  function  of inflation  and that the
absolute  value of the semi-elasticity  of money  demand  with respect to inflation  falls  with inflation,
as implied  by the model.
The seignorage-maximizing  "optimal"  inflation  rate will be given  by the solution  to
the implicit  function  givr.-  by the first order condition:
(17)  x  ,  = -1/g-(n,x
However,  suppose that the money  demand  function  is erroneously  supposed  to be of constant
semi-elasticity  and a log-linear  Cagan  function  is estimated. We can think of this as an estimation
of the linear approximation  of (16) in the neighborhood  of the historical  average  inflation  NH:
(18)  In m  = g(7c 1 )  + g(oil)  * (7x)
The estimated  "optimal'  inflation  3r..  will  then be given  by:
(19)  ,,  =  -11g(o)
The  assumption  that g">O (the absolute  value of the semi-elasticity  falls  with inflation)  ensures
that the estimated  optimal  inflation  Nx,, will rise with historical  average  inflation  x,H.  Since  ( 17) is
not affected  by the historical  average  inflation,  this means that the estimated  optimal  inflation  will
be greater than the true optimal  inflation  in countries  where historical  inflation  is higher  than the
true optimum,  and lower  in countries  where historical  inflation  is below the true optimum. Fiom
(17) and (19), we can see that the erroneous  calculation  of optimal  inflation  is due to failure to
take into account  the variation  in the semi-elasticity  as inflation  varies.82
APPENDIX  I
DECOMPOSMON  OF SEIGNORAGE
The decomposition  is based  on the following  equation  for seignorage  T:
(1)  T  =  MP*I  - P,,  U,  tl  =  Pr  nt  M  + M M
where P, is the price level at time t, K  is the real money  supply  at time t, and x, is the inflation
-rate  at time t.  The steady-state  value of seignorage  is given  by the following:
(2)  IC  M +
1+4 1+  1  +8
where a bar denote  an average  level of a variable,  and we assume  that real money  grows
proportionally  to output, with output growth  given  as g and the trend value of real money  as M.
The fist  term gives  the inflation  tax component  of seignorage,  while the second gives  the
seignorage  that accrues  from an increase  in real money  balances.
The deviation  of seigorage from the average  can then be given  as follows:
3)~T,-T  . j;  i1  (3)  ij
+ (M.  - M.t  &M
The first term here is the above-average  seignorage  due to the inflation  tax rate
being above average. The second term gives  the above-average  revenue due to the real money
base being above average. The third term gives  the real change in the money  base minus  the
amount that would  take place as money  grows  with output. The last term is the covariance  of
inflation  and money.83
- APPENDIX III
A MODEL OF PRiVATE  INVESTMENT  AND GOVERNMENT  CAPITAL
In the stylc  of the new  growth  literature,"  we assume  that there are constant
returns to scale  in all types  of capital,  where capital  is broadly  defined  to include  both physical
and human  capitaL However,  we aggregate  physical  and human  capital  and distinguish  only
between public  and private capital. Public  capital  includes  only  goods  that will not be produced  in
the absence  of government  intervention,  such as infrastructure. Private  capital  consists  of
investments  where the returns are not appropriable  by other agents. The government  can invest
in either type  of capital,  whereas  the private  sector will  invest  only in private  capital. We assume
that government  investments  in private  capital  are a perfect substitute  for those made by the
private  sector. This implies  a production  function  like the following:
I
(1)  Y = A  (y(K,+G,)q  +(l-y)G)-
where Kp  is private-owned  private  capital,  Gp  is government-owned  private  capital,  and G. is
government  infrastructure  capital. Infrastructure  capital  and private  capital  are imperfect
substitutes,  with elasticity  of substitution  l/(1-1).
We need to specify  a policy  rule whereby  government  capital  is determined. To be
consistent  with a steady  state solution,  the policy  ru!e needs to have government  capital  grow  with
the overall growth  of the economy. One analytically  tractable  policy  rule is that the government
invests  so as to maintain  a desired  ratio of infrastructure  to private  capital,  and government-
owned  private capital  to private-owned  private  capital:
(2)  Gp = eO  Kp
(3)  Go =  e  Kp
Growth in this economy  will  be given  by the usual Euler condition  that consumption
growth  responds  to the marginal  product  of private  capital  as follows:
(4)  8  c=  e
c  a
where  p is the rate of time preference,  6 is the rate of depreciation,  and o is the inverse  of the
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution.
"For a urvr  we Eas*,  qJng  Rebelo  and Levine  (1991)84
Taking  the £le,wative  of (1) with respect to K,, and substituting  in from (2) and (3),
the marginal  product  of private capital  will  be given  by:
(5)  a8y  = Ay  (y  + (l-y)  e  (10+e1y)  j
From (5), it can be shown  that an increase  in infrastructure  capital unambiguously
raises  the marginal  product  of private  capital (and thus growth),  while  an increase  in govemment-
owned  private capital  lowers  the rate of return to private  capital  and growth. Thus, whether
public  capital lowers  or raises  the rate of return to private  capital  depends  on whether public
investment  is in infrastructure  or in capital  goods  that are substitutes  for capital  in which  the
private  sector wants to invest.
However,  while the rate of return is straightforwardly  related to the comnosition  of
public  investment,  the response  of private  investment  is more complicated.  In steady state, the
ratio of private investment  to GDP wili  be given  by:
(6)  K  K
Y  Y
The effect of public  capital  on private  investment  depends not only on how  public  capital  affects
the rate of return, but also on how  it affects  thd steady  state ratio of private  capital to output.
From (1)-(3),  this ratio will  be given  by:
(7)  vp = A-l (y(a  +0)r  +( -Y)e))
Y  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I'
The ratio of private capital  to output goes down  if either type  of government  capital  increases,
which ;s simply  definitional  since  government  capital is defined as a ratio to private capital.
From (6), we see that private  investment  is unambiguously  negatively  related to
government  investment  in private  capital. This investment  lowers  both the rate of return to
private  capital and the ratio of private capital  to output.'
lhe relationship  between  private investment  and government  infrastructure  capital  is
ambiguous. Using (4), we can rewrite (6) as follows:
BY
(8)  1P =  _K '  I
Y  Y  Y
67te  apum  that ome  type  of gpwement capital is a perfect ubstitute for  private  capital  is aon3  than required  'Me
prae  rate  of mute  will  *ill fas  l with  pubic  iveatmets that ame  highly,  but not  perfectly,  subtitu'able for private  capitaL85
he firnt term in (8) gives the share of private capital in total production.  A sufficient condition
for infrastructure capital to increase private investment is that the share of private capital increase
with an increase in infrastructure capitaL which will occur if the marginal product of private
capital rises proportionately more than the ratio of private capital to output falls. Not
surprisingly,  whether this share rises or falls depends on the elasticity of substitution between
infrastructure and private capitaL An elasticity less than one (17<0)  will imply that the share rises
with higher infrastructure capitaL Thus, inelastic production is sufficient for infrastructure capital
to raise private investment.  However, a combination of high substitutability between private
capital and infrastructure and a low discount rate could imply that infrastructure capital lowers
private investment even though it increases the rate of return.
In conclusion, this appendix illustrates conceptually why the relationship between
private investment and public capital is theoretically ambiguous. Since in the case studies we only
observe the aggregate of all public investment, either sign is possible in the estimated
relationships.  A negative sign could be explained by a high proportion of public investment going
into production activities that substitute for private initiative, or by a high e!dsticity  of substitution
between infrastructure and private capitaL A positive relationship between private investment
and public capital must reflect a high proportion of public investment going to infrastructure.86
APPENDIX IV. SUSTAINABLE  DEFICITS
This appendix  presents the equation for the sustainable  primary  deficit  calculations
shown  in Section II.
We start with the current-price  budget  constraint  of the consolidated  total public
sector, comprised  by the non-financial  and financial  subsector,  the latter including  the central
banlk It equates the above-the-line  total nominal  deficit  (the sum of the primary  deficit  and net
total interest payments)  to below-the-line  financing  sources,  given by the change in monetary  and
non-monetary  public  debt holdings:
(1)  PD+jD+E.*=f  D
Py  Py  Py  PyPy  Py
where PD is the consolidated  total public  sector primary  deficit,  P is the GDP deflator,  y is real
GDP, i is the domestic  nominal  interest rate, D is the domestic  public  debt stock, E is the
nominal  exchange  rate, i  is the foreign  nominal  interest rate, D is the foreign  public  debt stock
and M is the base money  stock. All  variables  are in current-price  domestic  currency  units, unless
noted otherwise.
Simple  manipulations  of (1) allow  obtaining  the primary  deficit/GDP  ratio as:
(2)  pd=i* +(: +n)m  +d+(n-r)d+JQ+(n  -r'-e)d
where lower  case variables  pd, d, d,  and m are correspondingly  defined  as the ratios  of PD, D,
ED*  and M to GDP, respectively-,  x is the domestic  rate of inflation,  n is real GDP growth,  r is
the domestic  real interest rate, r' is the foreign  real interest rate, and  f  is the rate of real
exchange  rate depreciation.
Equation (2) shows  that the primary  deficit  of the consolidated  public  sector, as a
share of income,  is constrained  to the sum of the following  financing  sources:  inflation  tax and
seigniorage  on the monetary  base,  the excess  of domestic  growth  over the real costs of domestic
and foreign  debt, and increasing  demands  for monetary  and non-monetary  debt. Primary  deficits
are sustainable  if they  do not entail ever-increasing  debt and money  to income  shares,  but are
consistent  with debt and money  demands. In the absence  of explicit  demands  for public
liabilitiei - introduced in section Im -- sustainability is defined in the more restrictive sense of
constant debt and money  to income  ratios, consistent  with steady-state  (constant) inflation  and
interest rates.
The country  applications  summarized  in section II calculate  sustainable  primary
deficits  as determined  by equation (2), after imposing  the steady-state  condition  of constant
liability  to income  ratios. In most cases,  the calculations  assume  that today's (or 1988  or 1989)
liability  to income  ratios (i.e., those for 1988-1990)  are the relevant  steady-state  values. Country
applications  differ by the relevant  public  sector coverage  (centraL  general,  non-financial,  and total
public  sector), modifying  equation (2) accordingly.87
APPENDIX V
ALTERNATIVE  DEFINITIONS AND COVERAGE OF PUBLIC DEFICITS
A frequently used measure is the 'above-the-line' cash basis deficit, based on the
difference between total cash-flow expenditure and revenue.  Deficits measured on accruals (or
payment order) basis, however, reflect accrued income and spending flows,  independently if they
involve cash flows or not.  Accumulation of arrears on interest, wage or goods expenditure or on
tax revenue are reflected by increasing accruals basis deficits, without affecting cash basis
accounts.' 6
"Below-the-line"  nominal deficits are measured as nominal changes in net public
sector liabilities. Notwithstanding measurement errors, above-the-line (or current account)
accruals-based nominal deficits should be equal to below-the-line (capital account) nominal or
face-value flows of net public liabilities. Measured either way, these nominal deficits are often
called public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR).
However, below-the-line deficits are nominal flows which typically  differ strongly
from the change in the real market value of net public sector liabi!ities. The real value of nat
public liabilities differs from the PSBR due to capital gains or losses from changes in asset prices
or from changes in principal due to debt reduction programs. Among the empirically  most
significant  causes of changes in real net liabilities  are capital gains due to the amortization of
domestic public debt derived from domestic inflation, capital losses on foreign public debt due to
real depreciations, and capital losses from declines in the market value or principal of credits
extended to the private sector.
The inflationary component of public interest payments on domestic public debt is a
frequently made correction to above-the-line deficits to better reflect the change in net public
liabilities. The economic rationale for it is that it constitutes a compensatiorn  of private holders of
domestic debt which, being the counterpart of their capital loss from inflation, will be reinvested
in public debt holdings in order to maintain unchanged real debt stocks.  The difference between
PSBR and the inflationary component of domestic debt holdings is termed the operational public
deficit -- subtracting from it the remaining real interest payments on domestic debt, the primary
(or non-interest) deficit is obtained.
Economically  more meaningful deficit measures, consistent with forward-looking
behavior, imply adjusting deficits by considering govemment contingent liabilities  when they
accrue -- not when actual pay,ncnts are due.  Governments acquire contingent labilities as a
result of social security (Kotlikoff, 1988, Mackenzie, 1989), medical insurance, and special
government-sponmared  programs, such as bank deposit insurance and company bailouts (Towe,
1991). The most general economic concept of the deficit would then be the change in
government net worth (Buiter, 1983),  which will equal the expected present value of all taxes,
including the seigniorage on its nominal debt, plus the net value of current assets, including
The  twot  wrevalent  government  deficat  mures  are  those  pfcribed  by  the United  Nations  (1968)  and  the Intemadonl
Monetazy  Fund  (1986),  which  are  on accruas  and  cuh  basis,  rnpectively.88
natural resources  and fixed  capital,  less  the current value of all non-contingent  and contingent
liabilities.  (See Towe, 1991,  p. 118).
Alternative  public  sector coverage  ranges  from the central  government  (or "budget")
to the central banl.  The general government  adds the provincial  (or state) and municipal  (or
local)  governments  to the latter. A frequently  employed  coverage  extends  to the consolidated
non-financial  public  sector, adding  to (or consolidating  with)  general government  the non-financial
public  firms  or state-owned  enterprises (SOEs). International  practice  defines  the consolidated
non-financial  public  sector (CNFPS)  deficit by combining  the nominal  above-the-line  deficit or
PSBR  with the consolid5ated  operating  deficit  of non-financial  SOEs, the latter defined as the
difference between current revenue  and current expenditure.
An even broader concept  consolidates  the latter with the deficit of the financial
public  sector (state banks and in particular  the central  bank), the latter often called  quasi-fiscal
deficit. Thi  measure  reflects the broadest possible  measure  of the public  sector and its stance,
and is relevant in countries  where public  financial  institutions  engage  in heavy  pars-fscal
activities.89
STATISTICAL  APPEDIX:  TA4E  I
CONSOLIDATEo  PUBLIC  FISCAL  SURPCUS(#)  04  DEFICIT(-)
(2  OF MP)
..........................................................  ....................................................................................................................... 
........................................................
Avers"e  Average
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1900  1901  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1990 1970-U  varls4  yeaws ......................................................................................................................................................
OECD
Australti  2.6  2.3  2.1  *0.2  2.3  -0.6  -2.9  -0.6  -2.8  -2.6  -1.9  -1.2  -1.0  4.5  -4.0  -3.3  -3.0  -1.1  0.7  1.2  2.3  -I.0  -0.o  1970-90 Austria  1.2  1.5  2.0  1.3  1.  -*2.5  -3.7  -2.4  -2.8  -2.4  -1.7  -1.8  -3.4  -4.0  -2.6  -2.5  -3.7  -4.3  -3.1  -2.7  -1.1  -1.3  -1.  I90-90 BelgIum  -2.1  -3.0  -4.2  -3.6  *2.9  -5.3  -6.0  -6.3  -6.7  -7.S  -9.2  -13.1  -11.2  -11.4  -9.3  -8.7  -6.8  -7.2  -6.8  -6.5  -6.1  -7.0  -7.0  197M-90 Canda  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.9  *2.S  -1.8  *2.5  -3.1  -2.0  -2.8  -1.S  -5.9  -6.9  -6.5  -6.8  -5.5  -4.4  -2.6  -3.4  -3.0  -2.7  -2.7  19M8-90 Demn  rk  3.2  3.9  3.9  5.2  3.1  -1.4  -0.3  -0.6  -0.4  -1.7  -3.3  -6.9  -9.1  -7.2  -4.1  -2.0  3.4  2.5  0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6  1970-90 FInlnd  4.3  4.S  3.9  5.7  4.6  2.7  4.9  3.2  1.4  0.4  0.3  1.2  -0.6  -1.7  0.4  0.1  0.6  -1.2  1.4  2.7  2.5  1.9  2.0  1970-90 France  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.1  -2.2  -0.6  -0.8  -2.1  -0.6  0.0  -1.9  -2.8  -3.1  -2.8  -2.9  -2.7  -1.9  -1.8  -1.4  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  1970-90 German  0.2  -0.2  -0.S  1.2  -1.3  -S.6  -3.4  -2.4  -2.4  -2.6  -2.9  -3.7  -3.3  -2.5  -1.9  -1.1  -1.3  1.8  -2.1  0.2  -0.8  -2.0  -1.8  1970-90 Grewe  -0.1  -0.9  -0.3  -1.4  -2.2  -3.4  -2.6  -2.1  -1.7  -2.S  -2.9  -10.9  -7.6  -8.6  -10.2  -14.0  -12.7  -12.0  -14.5  -17.8  -17.2  -5.6  -6.9  1978-90 Ireland  -3.6  -3.5  -3.2  -3.8  -6.9  -A.L  -7.4  -6.6  -8.6  -11.0  -12.2  -13.3  -14.1  -12.0  -10.1  -11.8  -11.6  -9.2  -2.6  -2.8  -1.1  -8.6  -7.9  1970-90 Italy  -4.0  -5.9  -8.6  -7.9  -7.8  -12.9  -9.8  -6.6  -10.4  -10.2  -8.6  -11.6  -11.3  -10.7  -11.6  -12.  -11.7  -11.1  -10.9  -10.2  -10.2  -9.6  -9.6  197l -9s Japan  (% GP)  1.7  1.2  -0.1  0.5  0.4  -2.8  -3.7  -3.8  -S.S  -4.7  -4.4  -3.8  -3.6  -3.7  -2.1  -0.8  -0.9  0.7  2.1  2.7  3.1  -1.8  -1.3  1970-90 Netherlands  -1.1  -1.0  -0.4  0.6  -0.5  -3.0  -2.7  -1.6  -2.8  -3.7  -4.1  -S.5  -7.1  -6.4  -6.3  -4.6  -6.0  -6.5  -5.0  -5.1  -S.1  -3.6  *3.7  1978-90 Norway  3.2  4.3  4.S  s.  4.7  3.3  2.S  1.2  -0.1  1.3  S.  4.7  4.4  4.2  7.5  10.4  5.9  4.8  3.1  1.0  1.2  4.30  4.0  1978-90 Spain  0.0  -1.0  -0.1  0.8  -0.4  -O.S  -1.1  -1.4  -2.4  -2.2  -2.6  -3.9  -S.6  -4.6  -5.5  -7.0  -6.1  -3.2  -3.1  -2.1  -2.0  -2.6  -2.6  1970-90 Sweden  4.6  3.3  4.4  4.1  2.0  2.6  4.7  1.7  -O.S  -3.0  -4.0  -S.3  -7.0  -5.0  -2.9  -3.9  -1.3  4.2  3.4  S.3  4.6  0.2  0.7  19O-96 United  Kingdom  2.9  1.3  -1.3  -2.7  -3.9  -4.6  -S.0  -3.4  -4.4  -3.3  -3.4  -2.6  -2.4  -3.3  -3.9  -2.7  -2.4  -1.2  1.1  1.3  0.7  -2.4  -2.1  1970-90 Mnited States  -1.1  -1.8  -0.3  0.5  -0.3  -4.1  -2.2  -1.0  0.0  0.5  -1.3  -1.0  -3.5  -3.6  -2.8  -3,3  -3.4  -2.4  -2.0  -2.0  -1.3  -1.5  -1.?  1970-90




STATISTICAL  APPENDIX:  TABLE  I
C0USOIIOATED  MJSIC FISCAL  SLOtPLUS(.)  Olt DEFICIT(-)
(X  OF  GDP)
Averaep  Av.  rawe 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974. 1975 1976 1917?  1978 1979 1960 1981 1962 1983 1961.  196  196  196? 196  1969 1990  1970-88  various years
Developing  Citrnies
Argentine  -1.9  -4.4  -3.8  -7.5  -8.1  -15.1 -11.7  -5.1  -6.8  -6.1  -7.5  -13.3 -15.1 -15.2 -11.9  -6.0  -4.7  -5.5  '.4  -8.4  -8I4 1970-U Sanglade*  *14.S -11.6 -13.6 -13.0 -10.4 -10.5  -9.9  -8.4  -7.1  -7.2  -8.1  -11.0 -10.4 1960-90 SOl  lvia  -6.4  -9.0  -7.81  -14.7 -19.1 -27.4  -9.1  -3.4  -7.8  -6.7  -4.3  -3.3  -11.3 -10.1 1979-90 Brazil  35.2  -7.0  -3.5  -2.7  -4.3  -3.7  -3.3  -4.3  -3.6  -4.5  1961-88 Dulganla  -0.8  -2.6 1.2 -0.9  -0.6  -0.8  -0.7  1965-89 Burkina  Faso  -6.2  -3.1  -6.9  -5.5  -6.1 4.1  -5.6  -4.0  1964-89 Chile  -2.1  -7.5  -8.1  -19.0  -3.3  -2.1 4.0  0.4  1.4  4.6  5.4  0.4 -3.9  -3.5  -4.6  -2.9  -2.0  -0.2 3.6  3.8  -2.2  -1.9  1970-89 ColombIa  -6.9  -7.4  -6.3  -7.1  -0.9 0.9 -1.9  -2.7  -1.2  -4.0  -3.8  -6.8  -8.V  -8.5  -6.3  -3.5  -0.3  -2.0  -2.1  -1.6  -2.2  -4.3  -4.1  1970-90 -Cote dilvoire  -3.4  -4.5  -1.3  0.0  -0.9  -2.3  -12.4  -3.6  -8.4  -10.3 -12.2 -11.8  -15.9 -11.4  -1.7  2.0  -2.4  -7.3  -13.5 -14.4  -6.4  -6.8  1910-89 Dominica  -3.9  1.4  3.2  3.5  2.3  -8.8  1.3  -0.4  1984-89 Dominican  IepLblic  -0.3  0.8  1.4  -0.4  -2.6  1.9  -0.7  -1.3  -5i.  -5.1  -6.5  -5.8  -7.0  -S.3  -6.7  -0.9  -5.6  -3.8  -5.6  -3.1  -3.1  1970-88 Ecuador  3.1  0.8  -2.2  -3.3  -8.3  -6.2  -2.0  -4.6  -5.6  -6.7  0.0  -0.6  1.9  -5.1  -9.6  -3.1  -3.3  -3.3  1973-88 Ghana  1.3  -2.7  -3.5  -3.2  -5.1  -13.2  -9.2  -7.5  -7.1  -4.0  -6.0  -7.4  -4.1  -2.3  -0.3  -1.9  2.2  3.4  2.2  -3.6  -3.6  1970-88 Honduras  -8.5  -12.5  -12.7  -11.4  -8.2  -6.3  -6.1  -6.7  -7.2  -9.1  -8.6  1961-89 Indio  -3.14  -3.7  -3.0  -6.4  -7.3  -7.0  -7.5  -7.7  -9.1  -8.6  -8.6  -8.9  -9.3  -7.1  -7.3  1977-899 Indonesia  0.4  1.3  2.6  0.1 -4.1  -2.6 0.9 -2.9  -4.8  -2.0  -0.7  -2.7  -1.1  -1.2  1978-89 JamaIca  -14.5 -16.7 -15.3 -20.8 -16.6 -15.3 -13.6 -13.1 -13.2  -5.6  -5.4  -13.4  -4.3  -13.8 -13.1 1977-89 Jordan  -4.7  -8.3  -8.7  -4.7  -14.3 -15.3  -6.6  -14.2  -9.4  -9.6  1983-90 Kena  4~.1  -3.8  -7.0  -6.3  -9.9  -6.9  -3.9  -4.4  -4.9  -5.3  -6.6  4.43  -4.7  -5.6  -5.5  1977-89 Korea  -1.4  -1.7  -1.3  -1.4  -3.1  -4.6  -4.3  -1.6  -1.4  -1.2  .-  0.9  -1.6  -1.8  -1.8  1976-88 Malawi  -3.6  -6.9  -11.6 -13.6 -16.4 -12.1  -8.7  -7.0  -4.9  -9.6  -6.6  1.2  -0.4  -8.3  -7.7  1977-89 Malaysia  -11.9 -17.0 -17.9 -14.8 -11.1  -5.9  -10.3  -5.6  -2.7  -4.2  -6.1  -10.8  -9.8  1980-90 Meuico*  -3.5  -2.2  -4.4  -5.4  -5.7  -8.4  -7.2  -4.9  -5.1  -6.7  -8.3  -11.6 -15.4  -6.0  -2.9  -3.3  -7.0  -S.4  -0.7  2.0  -6.0  -5.6  1970-89 Morocco  -3.0  -4.0  -2.0  -3.9  -9.5  -18.1 -15.8 -11.3 -10.1  -9.0  -13.6  -9.2  -11.3  -8.1  -8.6  -5.7  -6.1  -5.5  -8.6  -8.6 1971-88 Nigeria  -1.1  -3.6  -9.1  -8.4  -10.1  -4.2'  -1.8  -2.8  -8.7  -10.8  -18.1 -6.1  -6.1  -6.2 1979-90 Oman  -0.2  -3.2  -2.1 -16.8  1.9  -7.4  0.2  .-4.6  -3.9  IM6-119 Pakistan  -3.7  -S.2  -9.3  -81.8  -8.3  -7.4  -8.3  -3.8  -4.8  -4.9  -6.4  -5.3  -7.1  -7.1  -8.3  -7.4  -7.8  -6.4  -6.8  -6.8  1972-89 Paraguay  -1.1  -2.2  -2.9  -0.6  0.2  -5.0  -3.3  -0.8  0.0  1.2  0.1  -2.9  -2.7  -3.3  -6.4  -2.6  -1.8  -2.9  -3.1  0.6  -2.2  -2.1  1970-89 Peru  -1.5  -5.4  -6.7  -7.2  -9.5  -6.8  -3.7  -6.2  -7.5  -8.1  -6.3  -6.3  1979-88 Phl  itilnes  -7.5  -6.3  -4.6  -3.3  -2.1  -4.8  -2.6  -3.0  -4.3  -4.3  -4.3  1961-89 Poland  -1.9  -10.7  -2.5  -0.9  -0.5  0.0  -0.3  -0.8  -0.9  -9.0  -2.1  -2.8  196-89 Sierra Leare  -10.5 -13.7  -7.1 -10.9 -10.8  -3.8  -4.0  -5.9  -8.7  -8.3  1962-89 Sri  Lanika  -12.4 -14.0 -10.6  -6.8  -9.7  -10.1  -8.7  -12.6 -10.8  -10.6 -10.6 1981-89 Thailand  -5.2  -5.4  -5.3  -3.1 0.7  -2.2  -5.0  -4.5  -5.3  -53  -6.3  -7.1  -7.6  -5.?  -7.3  -8.6  -6.6  -3.2 0.2 -1.4  -4.9  -4.7  1970-89 Trinidad &  Tobagp  -7.4  -10.9  -7.4  -6.4  -4.8  -8.0  -7.4  1965-89 Turkey  -10.6  -9.0  -11.9  -6.1  -6.1  -6.6  -9.2  -5.6  -4.3  -4.4  -3.9  -3.8  -7.1  -6.8  1978-89 Veneyuela  -1.6  -3.3  3.8  4.4  3.6  -3.6  0.4  8.6  5.0  -7.5  -5.4  -9.4  -1.3  -0.6  -0.6  1977-89 Zaire  -5.2  -1.9  -7.2 -10.5  -4.1  -0.7  1.2  -1.7  -3.1  -4.6  -3.8  -3.8  1979-88 Zambia  -14.4  -10.3  -12.2  -16.4  -15.6  -16.8  -8.9  -9.3  -19.8  -28.5  -10.8  -12.1  -9.4  -8.2  -14.6  -13.8  1977-90
Zimbabwe  -7.1  -6.5  -6.9  -8.1  -4.3  -7.8  -4.1 -4.8 -3.2 -1.3 -9.1  -13.5  -13.1  -14.4  -12.1  -14.5 -14.4  -10.9  -10.4  -8.8 -8.8  1970-88
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STATISTICAL  APPENOIX:  Table  2
(Ratio  to  GOP)
SUmmary  of  taxes  on  finanmil  intermediation  (excluding  inflation  tax)
..........................................................................................................
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
..........................................................................................
Easterly  (1989)  averages
...............
Argentina  0.1  0.1  0.7  1.7  0.3  *2.9  0.1  0.0
Chile  0.2  1.8  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4
Colombis  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.8  -0.9  -0.6  .0.3
Mexico  0.7  -0.2  5.5  3.9  1.7  0.1  5.1  2.0
Morocco  0.6  1.0  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.3  -0.6  0.4
Thailand  0.3  -0.0  -0.6  -0.7  -1.2  1.0  -0.8  60.4
Note:  tax  calculated  as  real  Interest  rate  times  government  domestic  debt  outside  central  bank  as  percent  of
(implicit  long-run  real  interest  rate  assumed  to  be  zero)
OIovarmini  nd  de  Molo  (1990)
.............................
Colota  es  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.3
Mexico  0.5  0.8  10.8  11.0  . 5.8
Morocco  1.1  5.5  2.9  3.7  4.7  3.3  2.3
Pakistan  3.6  2.9  3.3
Thoiland  1.2  0.9  0.2  0.5  1.7  -09  0.4
Zimabwe  5.8  4.6  9.1  6.7  7.4  -0.5  5.5
Note:  caleulated  as  difference  between foreign  and domestic  interest  rate  times  government  domestle  debt  out
Chamley  and  monohan  (1990)
)...........................
Cote d'Ivoire  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ghan  0.0  2.4  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.5
Note:  calculated  as  domestic  real  interest  rate  less  1  percent  times  goverrment  debt  outside  central  bank
............................................................................................................
Tax  on  time  dekosits  (from  IFS  dat and  rest  interest  rates  in  this  papor)
............................................................................................................
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1966  1987  1988  1989
....  :W..:  i............................................................ 
Argentina  08X  1.4X  3.4%  3.5%  4.0%  2.2%  1.6%  2.1X  -1.2X
Chile  -0.4%  -4.72  -3.8%  -0.5%  -0.1%  -0.4%  -0.1%  -0.4%
Cote  d'lv  0.4%  0.1%  -0.2%  -0.0%  -0.4%
Colombia  0.0%  O  0.1%  1  01%  -0.5%  0.4%  -0.3X  -0.4%  -0.2%  -02%
Ghan  0.9%  1.3%  0.4%  0.9%  0.3%  -0.1%  0.1%  0.4%  0.3%
Morocco  G.1X  0.4X  0.2  0.3%  -0.2%  -0.0%  -0.4%  -0.72  -0.8%
Mexico  1.3%  0.2%  3.92  1.9%  1.2%  0.22  1.2%  2.9%
Pakistan  0.4X  0.3%  -0.3X  -0.4X  -0.3%
Thailand  '.2%  0.1%  -3.2%  -3.1%  -5.72  -4.2%  -3.6%  -2.52  -2.72  -1.22
Zfnbabwe  0i.5%  0.6%  1.02  2.6%  0.6%  0.0%  1.0%  0.4X
...............................................................................  a............................
Note:  catcutated  as  dom stic reol interest  minus  OECD average  reai interest  rate  (0.9X)  tinws  tima  depositsPRF Working  Paoer  Series
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